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In this thesis, I shall attempt to show that the Greeks believed in the ideal of a 
marriage between the beautiful and the good.  This important philosophical ideal 
rests upon the premise that beauty depends upon function, behaviour and the 
intention of the agent.  It is the anti-modernist position.  This notion known to the 
ancient Greeks as kalos kagathos, which dates back to the times of Homer, seems to 
have been forgotten in our times.  This study will trace the development of this ideal 
from Homer to Aristotle.  This world view differs from the one we have come to 
understand under modernism.  First, I will cite some examples of how the beauty of 
anything can be measured by the amount of human goods it contributes to.  
Following this I shall discuss the marriage of the beautiful and the good within the 
context of Homeric and Hesiodic literature, and the influence of Solon in the 
marriage of the beautiful and the good in bringing about increased political stability 
in the Greece of his times.  Finally, I shall comment on the contributions of Plato and 
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In this thesis I shall be arguing that the question of what constitutes beauty depends 
upon whether one adopts a modernist or anti-modernist viewpoint.  By modernist, I 
mean that something may be considered beautiful in isolation, regardless of its use, 
or proposed purpose.  By anti-modernist, I mean that beauty must include the thing 
in its setting, or knowledge of its function.
1
I shall be arguing the latter viewpoint which originated with the ancient Greeks who 
believed in the ideal of a marriage between the beautiful and the good.  This ideal 
was known to them as kalos kagathos.  I shall use the terms “the ideal of kalos 
kagathos,” “the ideal of the marriage of the beautiful and the good” and “the Greek 
ideal” interchangeably throughout my thesis.  This ideal, that we appear to have lost 
sight of, has its roots in the epics of Homer and developed through the other writers 
represented in this thesis.  I shall argue that the marriage of the beautiful and the 
good is potentially present in people endeavouring to improve themselves, and their 
community.  This marriage resembles the dialectic of Socrate‟s in the Platonic 
dialogues.  Only one of these investigations yielded a result.
2
  However, Socrates
was never discouraged.  Socrates‟s tenacity inspires us to continued attempts at 
perfecting our own behaviour.  The marriage of the beautiful and the good, like all 
ideals, exists as something we aspire to.  Thus it can never be fully ours.   This notion 
differs from the one we have become accustomed to under modernism.   
According to Marjorie Harris, some authors believe that Plato holds that “beauty has 
value only insofar as it promotes “just conduct and true thinking,” which ought to be 
revealed in the use of a thing or in good behaviour.”3  If the intended use of a thing is
to contribute to human goods, then its beauty will depend upon the degree to which 
that intention is realised.  By human goods, I mean anything that furthers people‟s 
moral and physical development.  I shall give various examples of such things and 
attempt to show they can lose their beauty by being put to an evil use.
4
  I shall also
argue that objects manufactured with the aim of derogating from human goods lack 
all beauty because their goal is an evil one.  I shall contend that some objects are so 
obviously conducive to human goods that their beauty is self evident.  An example 
may well be a hand-crocheted garment for a young baby.
5
  I shall tie these ideas into
 2 
the thought of the various authors covered in this thesis.  I shall only consider man-
made objects.   I shall not deal with natural objects, except in Homer.  Lastly, I shall 
argue that the context of a manufactured object and its intended function are the 
same thing.   
In excluding the purpose for which the object was designed from our consideration, 
we are left in the position of somebody who did not know what the object was for at 
all.  The question should be, “what is that?” or, “what purpose does that serve?”  I 
shall be arguing that we must seek an explanation of why the object was brought into 
existence, and, where the use it has been put to already exists; does it have a history 
within human striving for excellence?  The object may still be in the experimental 
state in which case the inquirer will need to know its intended use.  Chapter One 
begins with a discussion of modern examples of things and activities linked to their 
function and setting which I shall use to show how the ideal of kalos kagathos makes 
its presence felt in our modern age.   
I will be pursuing an extended analogy throughout this thesis of a kitchen knife.  A 
well-made kitchen knife with its comfortable handle and sharp stainless steel blade 
immediately suggests excellence in both function and setting.  The preparation of 
food is a prerequisite to its human consumption; an undeniable human good. Other 
examples, like a speech in court, are not so obvious unless we have enough expertise 
to know whether the presentation is misleading, or in aid of justice.  On the other 
hand, a debate consists of speeches which are designed to win arguments.  If the 
object of this contest is to engender confidence in the speakers and teach them verbal 
skills, this too is conducive to human goods.  However, the Sophists‟ art, where 
winning at all costs is an end in itself,
6
 would be an evil exercise because it would 
deprive someone of their just desserts.  I also consider changing attitudes towards 
achieving various ends; such as capital punishment.  Instruments such as the gallows 
lose their beauty when their function falls from favour.  Similar considerations apply 
to instruments constructed for an evil purpose, such as torture chambers.  Such 
progressive thinking indicates the persistence of the Greek ideal in our times. 
Chapter Two examines the Iliad as a morality tale.  Central to the plot is the scenery 
of cosmic excellence, such as the rose-fingered dawn and well-made weapons that 
the epic is set in.  This unchanging picture of inanimate perfection serves as a 
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contrast to the aristocrats in their unrealised human potential.  I begin by analysing 
several terms of value, and their opposites, to show how Homer used them in 
unfolding a story of infidelity, personal conflict, and war, which culminated in the 
flourishing of Achilles‟ character in the expression of compassion.  I also include 
several episodes which depict the stages of Achilles‟ growth along the way.  These 
episodes all contain moral lessons, such as the advice Phoenix gives to Achilles to 
resolve his quarrel with Agamemnon.  Phoenix says that a kind heart is better than 
pride.  This example actually portends Achilles‟ compassion.  I argue that this virtue 
ties human behaviour to cosmic and divine paradigms.  The ideal of kalos kagathos 
originates in Homer. 
Chapter Three discusses Hesiod‟s farming community eking a bare existence out of 
bleak and unfertile lands.  This setting is the antithesis of the plenteousness of the 
Iliad.  The peasant world could only yield a living if people took full advantage of 
their meagre lot.  I shall show how Hesiod taught them to eschew injustice, cooperate 
with seasonal patterns and engage in wholesome competition in the agora to make 
the best of what they had.  Hesiod sought to make people‟s behaviour imitate nature, 
which consisted not only in learning more effective ways of earning a living, but also 
in refining the cooperative social virtues.   
In order to do this Hesiod traced a cosmogony of the gods from Kronos down to 
Zeus, one of whose daughters was dike, whose divine role was to report injustice to 
Zeus.  This identification of justice with the gods was a metaphor for people to 
replicate the divine in their own behaviour.  Hesiod‟s purpose in writing his poetry 
was to put people in touch with their human nature so that it would blossom into 
fulfilment.  For Hesiod the setting is already present, but without a full awareness of 
it, such as the part played by the gods and nature: people would not be able to take 
full advantage of it.  They would not be aware of the ideal of kalos kagathos and how 
inviting it into their lives would enrich them.  I shall show that Hesiod realised the 
kitchen knife needed to take some responsibility for its impaired cutting ability.   
Chapter Four introduces Solon, an archon who enjoyed the power necessary to 
innovate behavioural change on a national level.  Like Hesiod, Solon thought justice 
was of divine origin.  Unlike Hesiod, who could only encourage people to embrace 
justice and stay away from the injustice of corrupt judges, Solon changed the laws to 
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give everyone equal opportunity to better their station in life.  Using a thoughtful 
program of legislative reform, Solon was able to ensure that justice potentially 
extended through all levels of society.  I shall argue that Solon‟s contribution to 
human goods was to make it easier for everyone to achieve it without the need to fear 
oppression.  Solon did not make many laws that intruded on people‟s privacy.  They 
had to invite justice into their lives.  The agrarian classes found this when Solon 
refused to go as far as they wanted in breaking up large tracks of land held by 
experienced owners.  Solon confronted the whole of Greece with the ideal of kalos 
kagathos.  He realised the kitchen needed a face-lift.  Like Homer he left the 
improvement of the kitchen knife to those who would be using it.   
In the fifth chapter I explore Plato‟s contribution to the ideal of the marriage of the 
beautiful and the good in his paradigms of the Sun, the Cave and the Divided Line.  
The function of these models is to encourage people to explore the suprasensible 
forms using the structure of the world as a comparison.  This was a departure from 
the work of earlier writers, who were concerned with making one‟s way in this 
world.  I shall show how Plato ties the function of sight to that of the intellect, which 
ought to enable us to attain a deeper and richer appreciation of our human nature and 
the setting in which it is continually maturing.  Plato‟s position is that people will 
never do what is harmful to them.  However, in order to reach this stage they need to 
be more aware of their human nature and how best to cultivate it.  Socrates 
announces the “good” in The Republic when he says, “justice is a human being 
functioning excellently.”7  He was referring to the master craftsman who would make 
a perfect kitchen knife every time.   
Chapter Six examines Aristotle.  Aristotle did not believe in the Platonic forms.  For 
Aristotle the way to a virtuous life lay in the standards of a virtuous community.  The 
agent had to embody the virtue, not simply mimic it.  To this end Aristotle developed 
the Doctrine of the Mean in which he advocated balanced behaviour in all 
circumstances.  I shall discuss how this equilibrium is achieved by way of some 
examples.  Aristotle also considered that the emotions played an important part in 
human activity.  I shall also touch on his treatment for emotional excesses in my 
discussion of his Poetics.  
 5 
In this introduction, I have indicated that I will use modern examples of things and 
communal activities to show how the Greek ideal has come down to our modern 
world.  I have also summarised the work of ancient Greek authors and briefly 
described how the ideal of the marriage of the beautiful and the good developed 





















The Fish Hook and Some Other Examples 
In this section I will advance the argument that the ideal of kalos kagathos is present 
in all human endeavours that strive for personal and communal achievement.  I shall 
put forward various examples of things and activities and discuss their functions and 
settings and how they may lead to the realisation of human goods in the modern 
world.  I will also mention some examples that derogate from the production of 
human goods.  
A fish hook is designed to catch fish for human consumption.  There is an eyelet for 
the line to attach to at the top, a sharp hook to accommodate the bait and a barb on 
the inside of it to ensure that it stays firmly embedded in the fish‟s mouth when it 
bites.  The beauty of the hook inheres in its effective function.  Some people may 
focus on the fish suffering, but it is generally accepted that fish cannot be caught in 
any other way (commercial netting aside) and that any overreaction to the method is 
overshadowed by the desirability of fish in our diet.  In addition to this, angling is a 
sport pursued by a great number of people all over the world for the sheer pleasure of 
catching the fish, or for the relaxation that it offers.  Moreover, fish is good for us as 
a source of protein and beneficial dietary components which produce health without 
which we could not develop other human goods. Thus the suffering the fish may 
endure is subordinated to the greater human good of furthering health.  
Sometimes the object‟s beauty will be self evident, such as the function of a warm 
fire in the hearth.  However, there will be times when reflection will be necessary.  
Our view may well change over the course of history.  An example of this is a 
gallows where precise functioning is a must in order to cause instantaneous death.  
The gallows are a good example because while the technique of its construction may 
not have changed very much over the course of history, people‟s view of capital 
punishment has.  Such changes contribute to our evolving idea of what human goods 
are, and how best to achieve them.  Whether an object is beautiful will depend on our 
view of its function from time to time.  The function may remain ideal, but the end it 
serves may lose favour as we progress in humane thinking.  A further example of 
objects losing favour for similar reasons is the cat-o‟-nine tails.   
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A lot of thought went into the designing of the cat-o‟-nine-tails with its over-tied, 
sun-dried knots.  It was very apt for its function.  A more enlightened approach to 
deterring the conduct it was designed to stamp out made it pass into obsolescence.  
Our sense of beauty can only be refined by the continual use of our imagination in 
improving the ways we go about achieving human goods: in this case, punishment.  
As we come to learn more about how human beings function and what drives them 
we develop a heightened sensitivity and an aversion to cruelty.  We become more 
conscious of the need to find ways of improving our quality of life and realise that, 
like the Greek ideal, this task is never ending. 
A philosopher more in touch with the sensitive virtues in the nineteenth century was 
Jeremy Bentham, the forerunner in the movement of abolishing cruelty to animals.
8
  
Many people believed that being cruel to animals did not matter because they could 
not reason.  Bentham rightly pointed out that it is enough that they could suffer.  This 
forced people to think about why cruelty had been tolerated. People sought more 
satisfactory ways to achieve obedience to the rules flogging was designed to 
accomplish, i.e. deterrence and punishment.  Methods of correction that respected the 
dignity of wrong-doers presented as more effective.  They improved the setting of 
reform by tempering the punitive and accentuating rehabilitation.  In the outlawing of 
sadistic practices we see the Greek ideal making its presence felt.   
Unless this softer approach were adopted, punishment may result in resentment 
causing people to rebel against society, possibly perpetrating more crime.  If the 
punishment were viewed as just, then an attempt to rehabilitate the offending person 
is more likely to reform them and contribute to society‟s betterment.  The 
development of a humane approach to punishment looks forward to the ideal of kalos 
kagathos in the conversion of Achilles from short-sighted sulkiness to compassion.  I 
discuss this story in chapter two on the Iliad. 
The Sun – The Source of Beauty 
Beauty in the dawn of the life-giving sun looks forward to an important motif in 
Homer which he uses as part of the cosmic perspective of the setting of the Iliad.  
The sun supplies life-sustaining ingredients and also avails us of the means to relate 
to the world around us, and each other, by providing the medium of sight.  The 
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setting is ideal and has built into it our means of replicating its splendour.   With a 
measured exposure to it, there can be nothing attributed to the sun but goodness as 
the source of life and sight.  This holds good even in the arid and parched regions of 
the desert, and correspondingly in cold climates, as people‟s adaptability to nature in 
all regions shows.  This versatility suggests that the Greek ideal is always latent in 
communal undertakings.  However, what the sun enables us to see may well be 
another matter, as subsequent discussion in this thesis will show.   
We may object that the sun causes maladies such as skin cancer.  However, it is too 
much exposure to the sun‟s rays that is the cause of ailments.  Our increasing 
knowledge of how the human body functions, and of the things that cause it to 
malfunction, corresponds to our growing awareness of what contributes to our good.  
This constant accretion of knowledge involves attaining a balance of things that the 
human body can tolerate and our understanding of its beauty in operation and 
development.    Like the ideal of kalos kagathos it is a never ending process. 
Similarly, the new born baby is beautiful as a manifestation of the love parents give 
to each other and is also a new member of the family.  We may simply look upon 
him/her and enjoy the beauty of his/her babyish antics whether crying, feeding or 
kicking in his/her cradle.  We may feel sure that what we see is unspoiled nature in 
its human reproduction and a joyful addition to the family and the community.   
This ought to hold good even if the baby were unwanted or deformed.  If parents in 
that position could be persuaded to refocus on themselves, they too would be able to 
appreciate the beauty before them in the cradle.  Similar considerations ought to 
apply in respect to the deformed child.  Elliott Sober suggests that “It is no more a 
part of human nature to be healthy than diseased”9 and MacIntyre reminds us: 
Those captivated by appearance and presentation may not be able to identify, let alone 
 understand, examples of the courage and gracefulness of spirit that can be won-hard 
 responses to afflictions of disfigurement and disablement, and this will be a failure to 
 understand the importance of some virtues of acknowledged dependence.
10   
Parents in this position may one day become dependant upon others.  At that time, 
they too will need special care just as the child in their care does at the present time.  
 9 
The human good here is compassion.  The rich opportunity for growth as a family is 
a further instance of the Greek ideal.  
 Some Instances of Lack of Beauty: Adolf Hitler and Sharp Practices in Court 
Unless we knew the future of the child we would remain captivated by his/her 
beauty.  People may feel revulsion gazing upon an infant Adolf Hitler if they could  
foresee his nefarious, future deeds, but, as that could not happen, the picture we see 
before us in the crib is the complete one for now.  This would apply even if we knew 
the child was orphaned, because pity and compassion ought not to affect the child‟s 
beauty.  It is possible for a whole range of emotions to be felt at the one time, 
provided they are not the antithesis of each other. For example, it would not be 
possible to feel love and hate in the same instant.  One possibility of us seeing 
ugliness in such an apparently beautiful baby would be to see it in such films that 
depict the devil's progeny as a good looking child in the cradle.   
Behaviour deviating from the pursuit of the ideal of kalos kagathos may be found in 
an apparently well-executed plea in a law court.  The advocate may be endeavouring 
to persuade the court in an unworthy case.  If someone who is able to appreciate 
persuasive eloquence were in the gallery, they may well be favourably impressed by 
it.  However, at the end of the speech the judge ought to recognise it for a charlatan‟s 
attempt to secure an undeserved verdict.   
Even after the speech had been rejected, some people in the gallery may still adhere 
to the view that the speech was beautiful because they are not educated in the judicial 
process and how it should further its ends.  Ignorance of the judicial process would 
limit their view to an appreciation of the speech as an end in itself.    This misuse of 
oratorical ability had its counterpart in ancient Greece in the Sophists‟ art of debating 
for victory at the expense of the truth.  This practice was the antithesis of the Greek 
ideal because human goods are not located in the selfish exercise of trying to obtain 
profit unjustly.  For the Greeks this was an exercise in hubris.
11
 
However, the judge will realise that the judicial process ought to be directed towards 
assisting the court to arrive at a just verdict. After hearing the whole of counsel‟s 
address, the judge may conclude that it lacks sincerity, or does not reflect the 
evidence.  For him the speech may well lose any of the beauty it may have appeared 
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to have during the delivery and reveal itself not to assist justice, but rather to impede 
it.  To the judge the charlatan speech would be as ugly and as out of place as a viper 
in one‟s parlour.   
Both the speech and the snake lack beauty because they are out of their appropriate 
setting.  The snake in the parlour represents a threat to the family, whereas to the 
herpetologist the reptile in its natural habitat would be beautiful as a properly 
functioning example of the species.  Likewise, the speech may be beautiful in a 
debating society where eloquence per se is highly valued, but lacks beauty because it 
fails to further the ends of justice.  These considerations would apply even in a 
student moot court because the aim of the pedagogic exercise is to teach future 
advocates to argue logically in support of their case and to embrace the goods of the 
legal profession they are preparing to enter.  In such a setting the ideal of kalos 
kagathos reveals itself assertively.    
The Kitchen Knife and the Samurai Sword 
The discussion so far is an attempt to show how we replicate the ideal the Greeks had 
of the harmony produced when things function according to a design aimed at 
producing human goods.  In considering whether this is so one needs to ask what the 
end (telos) of any given thing, or operation, is.  For example, the telos of a good 
kitchen knife is to slice food.  A well-made knife will have a well-contoured handle 
that comfortably fits the hand with a sharp blade properly angled and made out of 
some durable material that results in easy cutting.  In this culinary setting no one 
would deny that such an instrument is a good knife.  It will also be a beautiful knife 
because of the well-engineered attributes I have ascribed to it.   
Let us imagine, however, that our well-constructed knife is a samurai sword.  These 
weapons, too, were well-balanced and made.  The difference is that they were 
created for a caste of Japanese warriors who used them to oppress the peasants and 
keep them in submission.  The samurai trained hard to become accomplished martial 
artists and used to prey upon people who could not defend themselves against their 
military prowess.  Their swords were designed as instruments of slaughter and 
carnage.  The contemplated end for these swords was not a noble one, but rather an 
adjunct to the perpetration of murder and thuggery.  In this scenario the Greek ideal 
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is absent.  Such behaviour looks forward to the short-sighted theft of Briseis by 
Agamemnon from Achilles, where the ideal of kalos kagathos unravelled because 
Agamemnon put his own pleasure before the communal good.  This was a further 
exercise of hubris.  
On the other hand, if people focused on the qualities of the samurai during the 
Kamakura period (1192–1333) when the samurai developed a deep pride in their 
military skills and their stoicism, developing unique Japanese arts such as Sado and 
Ikebana, they may see the samurai sword as a beautiful symbol.  The samurai are 
said to have followed an unwritten code of conduct which prized bravery, honour 
and personal integrity above life itself.  The sword in this setting would be a symbol 
of beauty because everyone would agree that striving after these things conduces to 
human good.  The human goods here are patience and the cultivation of inner 
harmony brought about by a sense of achievement in perfecting activities that others 
may enjoy and, perhaps, take up.   
The samurai sword as a symbol of the warrior caste that produced the beautiful arts I 
have mentioned represents an age in which arts that conduced to human goods 
flourished.  Sado and Ikebana encourage precision in human movements and the 
development of skill by the refining of the virtues of patience and physical 
coordination.  The martial arts, to which the samurai culture contributed, are 
productive of physical and mental health.  For this reason people practise them today.  
The samurai sword is seen in this setting as beautiful because the observer focuses 
upon these positive aspects of the earlier samurai culture.     
However, to an observer who concentrated on the slaughter and killing, for which the 
earlier samurai were renowned, the sword would be ugly.  It would then remind us of 
their participation in the rebellion of the 1870s when discontented samurais tried to 
regain their lost privileged position in society, causing carnage and loss of innocent 
life.  In this alternative view of earlier and later samurai culture the samurai sword 
would lose its status as a symbol of beauty and become an object of evil.   
It is impossible to see a samurai sword as a thing of beauty in this latter context.  The 
setting reflects wanton carnage fired by ignoble motives.  The samurais had lost their 
exalted position in society as a result of changing times and perverted their erstwhile 
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honourable prowess in martial arts in an attempt to wrongfully wrest from society 
that which was no longer theirs.   It is a perversion of the use of the attributes of 
other well-made tools, such as the well-made kitchen knife, and designed to serve an 
evil purpose.  This is an example of spurious and superficial beauty being exposed as 
ugly in its intended evil use.  Human goods cannot be realised if some people benefit 
wrongly at the expense of others.  The ideal of kalos kagathos is ousted in such 
activities.   
The marriage of the beautiful and the good is not difficult to appreciate in obvious 
examples such as the kitchen knife.  The preparation of food and the art of cooking 
are human goods.  It is, of course, possible to imagine a kitchen knife that does not 
cut properly, is difficult to sharpen and may well not fit comfortably into the palm of 
the hand.  Such a knife would be considered ugly, whether its use were to aid the 
preparation of food, or to commit a murder.  In the first instance it would be 
frustrating to use and in the other an object of horror.  It would fail to be an ideal 
knife.   
We need to be aware that all well-designed artefacts have their own beauty and 
should not be compared with unrelated things.  Plato sounds this warning in his 
Hippias Major when he has Socrates describe a well- sculptured pot.
12
  Socrates 
says: 
 If the pot has been fashioned by a good potter so that it is smooth, well-rounded and 
 properly fired, like some very fine pots that there are of the two-handled variety with a 
 capacity of six choes – if that‟s the sort of pot he‟s asking about, I would agree that it is 
 fine.
13
   
  
Hippias agrees, but says that it is “not up to the standard of fine horses, girls and so 
on”.14 
Socrates shows that comparing the pot with horses and girls is a misconceived tack 
on the part of Hippias by quoting Heraclitus: 
 Ah, I see, Hippias! We must reply to our inquisitor as follows: “Sir, you are overlooking the 
 correctness of Heraclitus‟ dictum that 'the finest ape is contemptible compared to man‟”.  The 




Socrates concludes that nothing can be fine if at the same time it is contemptible.  
Hippias threw away an opportunity of progressing the discussion towards 
discovering what fineness (kallos/beauty) is when he ignored the description by 
Socrates of the well-made pot and compared it to something else rather than 
pondering its own characteristics.  The discussion could then have gone on to show 
the cohesion of excellences in other things under discussion and how these things 
create human goods by their contribution to the community.  It is the combination of 
excellences in people and their activities that the Greeks were constantly striving to 
perfect. 
It is conceivable to have two pots side by side, one more aesthetically pleasing than 
the other.  Both pots function in retaining water.  The prettier one has an additional 
function; that of giving aesthetic pleasure which delights the senses with its 
symmetry and blending colours.   
The beautiful and the good may be united and then come apart.  In my chapter on 
Homer I will show that this occurred on several occasions.  A kitchen knife used in 
an attempted robbery may cause a temporary loss of beauty in the knife.  One could 
imagine an intruder in one‟s house, picking up a kitchen knife and threatening one 
with it.  In a subsequent interview with the police, one may handle and regard the 
knife with some trepidation.   
However, when the knife was returned to the others and the entire set were put to its 
intended use, the memory of the knife as a threatening weapon would fade.  The case 
would be different in the case of a hatchet which had been used in a murder and 
exhibited in a museum.  For the anti-modernist, that hatchet‟s beauty would be 
forever marred because of the use it had been put to and the associations it would 
conjure up in the eye of the beholder.  That particular hatchet would never again be 
associated with a harmless implement for splitting wood.   
We all form mental pictures of the convenience everyday objects mean in our 
everyday social lives.  We have usually seen these things so often we automatically 
categorise them in their accepted setting. An expert experienced in the use of the 
object may move on to a consideration of its adaptability to its intended purpose.  
The accomplished barber will automatically evaluate the efficacy of a razor.  The 
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tailor may assess the features of the sewing machine and the lawyer will be interested 
in the clients and the library of a practice he intends to purchase.  These latter 
evaluations involve a closer weighing-up of the attributes of the object which is made 
possible by a deeper knowledge of why it was brought into existence.  The callings 
of these people are honourable and are directed to human goods.  Diligent practice of 
the professions produces excellence in the practitioners and provides a valuable 
contribution to the community.  This looks forward to Hesiod‟s healthy competition 
in the agora, which ensures ongoing refinement of the artefacts produced there.
16
   
The marriage of the beautiful and the good, then, takes place in the setting of the 
object in question.  Like the Greek ideal of kalos kagathos it is continually being 
perfected.  The real question is how successful the union is.  If the field of human 
endeavour that it is designed to further is a good, it should follow that an 
examination of the object will focus on how effectively this end will be achieved by 
it.  Provided that end is conducive to human goods, the object will be beautiful.  The 
opposite impression will be made if an examination of the object‟s function reveals it 
to be an evil one.  
There is a philosophical controversy as to whether an objective conception of human 
good exists.  Stephen Toulmin points out that we do things because there are good 
reasons for doing them, but suggests that this does not mean that one knows what 
“goodness” is.17  Failure to be able to define „fineness‟ is the problem Socrates 
encountered in the Hippias Major.  Phillipa Foot allows that some people: 
Say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another will refuse to take that fact 
 as any „evidence‟ at all, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of good which connects it 
 with one piece of evidence rather than another.
18
   
Such writers present a possible objection to my thesis.  However, my thesis is that 
with constant attention to improving ways of producing human goods, we 
continually close the gap between our present methods of achieving social harmony 
and the ideal we are seeking.  No one would deny the human goods served by a well-
made knife, or courteous behaviour.  The ideal of kalos kagathos appears in the 
fusion of the excellence of the product and behaviour of the agent.  It is present in the 
constant improvement, whether in personal conduct or the manufacture of things for 
communal consumption.   
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The manufacturer competes with others to provide the best possible tool to achieve 
the desired result, e.g. a chainsaw that is comfortable to use and has all possible 
safety features together with a durable, easy to sharpen cutting chain.  This 
foreshadows the Hesiodic message to his agrarian neighbours.  It is through healthy 
competition in plying his craft in the agora that both potter and pot are benefited.  
The discerning designer will not only judge which is the best one the market offers, 
but will also question how the tool may be improved.  Increased efficiency in getting 
the job done will result in a human good that had not hitherto been understood.  A 
further example of this is surgery uncovering a discovery of how a disease may be 
treated.  In these pursuits we see the ideal of kalos kagathos as a constant, and yet 
elusive, goal. 
We make continual improvements in the various fields of science, surgery and art 
because of the dedication and imagination of those practicing these disciplines.  The 
developments that I have been describing are instances of human potential being 
harnessed and accomplished.  Human potential appears to be limitless.  This belief is 
foundational to the ideal of kalos kagathos flourishing in human communities.   
I acknowledge an objection to my theory.  Modernists may say that the samurai 
sword, or the mechanically well-engineered pulleys in a torture chamber used for the 
dislocation of finger and toe joints, are beautiful.  However, the gradual abolition of 
brutal punishments, coupled with the recognition of human rights at all levels of 
society in most developed countries, indicates a movement towards a growth of 
spiritual values that are not compatible with inhumane behaviour.  Modernists fail to 
take into account the function and setting of these things that are productive of 
carnage and human suffering.  They consider the craftsmanship in them without 
focusing upon the ends that such well engineered features will bring about.  This is a 
incomplete conception of beauty.     
In this chapter I have chosen several things and activities to illustrate how the Greek 
ideal manifests itself in community-based projects and objects.  Some, such as the 
speech in court, and the samurai sword, have needed more detailed investigation than 
others, whose excellence of function and setting is more obvious. Reflections of this 
nature lead us into other periods of history and how people strive to achieve their full 
human potential in them. In the next chapter of this thesis, I shall explore Homer‟s 
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call to moral awakening in the aristocratic society of his times.  Before exploring 
some of the motifs of the Homeric literature, I shall look at the origin of the phrase 
kalos kagathos and then at some of the terms of value employed by Homer is teasing 






















An Historical Analysis of the Phrase Kalos Kagathos 
To date, there have been only three major publications concerning the origin and 
meaning of the term kalos kagathos.  Herman Wankel
19
 wrote a dissertation in 
Germany in 1961, Walter Donlan
20
 wrote an article reviewing Wankel‟s thesis in 
1973 and in 1995 Felix Bourriot
21
 wrote a two volume work in which he traced the 
term kalos kagathos from Herodotus in the fifth century to Aristotle.  It is to the epics 
of Homer and these authors I now turn. 
Herman Wankel 
According to Herman Wankel,
22
 the term kalos kagathos existed as an attribute of 
the aristocracy as early as Homer, and during the archaic period was subjected to a 
umwertung (re-evaluation) by the aristocratic poets.
23
  His argument is that the poets 
purged the original meaning of its purely social connotations and it gradually became 
an ethically and morally charged term.  Wankel goes on to say that in the late part of 
the fifth century the term kalos kagathos became a political catchword by the 
oligarchical elements reacting to those members of society who questioned the 
aristocratic claim to exclusively use the term.
24
   
Wankel drew upon various philological studies of the term from C. Kohnhorn
25
 
through to W Jaeger‟s Paideia,26 although his thesis is indebted to the dictum of 
Jaeger who maintains: 
 Culture is simply the aristocratic ideal of a nation, increasingly intellectualised.27 
Wankel also draws upon a theory proposed by Nicolai Hartmann that the concept of 
aristocracy does not consist merely in political, social and economic pre-eminence, 
but it represents the inherent ethical tendency of the aristoi (nobles) not only kratein 
(to be descended from) but arista legein (to select the best).
28
  By this, Hartmann 
meant that the Greek aristocrat, “was not simply the product of a particular class 
structure, but was also a conspicuous axiological exemplar.”  He was “even in his 
basic tendencies somehow already morally in advance.”29  
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Felix Bourriott 
An objector to Wankel‟s thesis, Felix Bourriot, wrote a two volume work in which 
he traced the term kalos kagathos from Herodotus in the fifth century to Aristotle.
30
  
Bourriot holds that the term came into Attic Greek from Sparta where it described a 
class of Spartans remarkable for their ability in battle.
31
  In the last part of the fifth 
century the term became associated with “young snobs”, such as Alcibiades.32  
Alcibiades‟ fine features contrast with Socrates‟ snub nose33 and protruding eyes and 
Thersites‟ extreme ugliness.34  Alcibiades‟ beauty was the physical inheritance of his 
aristocratic blood.  However, his behaviour had been fashioned by the Sophists,
35
 
such as Protagoras, whose art was to impart the verbal skills necessary to win 
arguments which rested upon relativistic principles.
36
  Glib argument designed to win 
worldly riches was their profession.  Socrates, on the other hand, sought the ideal of 
kalos kagathos in the pursuit of precise knowledge.  He boasted that he did not 
charge any fees.
37
  This was a thrust at the Sophists.  Thersites‟ haranguing of the 
Achaean nobles at Troy when he upbraided them for their hubris and pleonexia rang 
of a similar desire to impart human values aimed at the good of all.   
The thirty tyrants who were the ruling party considered themselves kalo kagathoi.  
Alcibiades was one of these.
38
 In the last decade of the fifth century kalos kagathos 
was used to refer to the bourgeois supporters of the oligarchs of Thermanes.
39
 Then 
in the fourth century kalos kagathos assumed two different meanings, one dealing 
with social status and the other with moral and civic virtue.
40
   
According to Bourriot the culmination of the development of the term is to be found 
in Aristotle‟s Eudemonian Ethics, where it enjoys a special place as the complete 
moral excellence which can only be achieved by a leisured social and intellectual 
elite.
41
 This is the embodiment of the ideal of the marriage between the beautiful and 
the good.  Bourriot is correct in pointing out that the term as a linguistic label dated 
from the fifth century and was used by Herodotus.  However, I am looking at the 
moral content of the term and not divorcing the evolution of it from its wider 




Walter Donlan also denies that the term was used earlier than the fifth century when 
the historian Herodotus first used the words kalos kagathos.
42
  Donlan traces the use 
of the term agathos through the three hundred years or so between the Homeric times 
and Herodotus.  He observes that the traditional claim of the aristocracy to the title 
agathoi was in jeopardy by the last third of the sixth century.  Coined money and the 
rise of mercantile classes had made it possible for people of less than good birth to 
attain wealth.
43
  As wealth was one of the necessary conditions of being agathos, 
people who had hitherto been kakoi (bad, non aristocratic, vulgar) were now agathoi.   
According to Donlan, soon after the last third of the sixth century the aristocracy 
arrogated to themselves the term kalos.
44
  This is because as a class they generally 




These three authors have studied the term from an etymological perspective.  I am 
indebted to them for their scholarship.  However, I am looking for a deeper 
unrecognised dimension to the Greek conception of value which I contend started in 
the Homeric epics.  I shall now consider some authors who have examined some 
terms of value in Homer other than kalos kagathos.   
I have chosen Alasdair MacIntyre, E.R. Dodds, A.W.H. Adkins and Eric Vogelin, 
some of whose works I refer to below. The first of these three discussed terms of 
behavioural value that are essential to my thesis.  Homer used these words as a 
linguistic vehicle to convey to his aristocratic audience the desirability of cultivating 
the cooperative virtues.  Vogelin argues that the Homeric epics provide us with a 
meditation on the sources of disintegration of Mycenaen civilisation.  He argues that 
in plotting the decline and fall of a society, Homer created the literary means for 
people to rethink their own lives by replicating cosmic excellence within them.   
An Analysis of the Terms Agathos, Arete and Other Related Terms of Value in 
Homer 
According to MacIntyre, the word agathos in Homer meant kingly, courageous or 
cunning, and so the question, “is he agathos?” is the same as the question, “is he 
kingly, courageous, clever and cunning?”  So in the Homeric epics this type of 
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behaviour is sufficient to entitle a man to be called agathos.
46
  Adkins agrees with 
this view.  He tells us that Homeric man lived in small social units (oikoi) under the 
headship of a local chieftain denoted by the term agathos.
47
 The nature of Greek 
society at the time meant that the head of the oikos could not rely upon anyone else 
for support.
48
  Success in this war-like aristocratic function was imperative to 
maintain the status of agathos.  Here we see a similarity with the samurai warriors.  
Their continued kudos depended upon success.  This was the Greek ideal in its 
rudimentary stage. 
Whilst we assess the beauty of a kitchen knife depending upon its intended use, i.e. 
either a culinary instrument or a murder weapon, there were no other settings in 
which the members of the oikoi could consider their chieftain.  W.H. Auden tells us 
that provided acts, such as Achilles mistreating the body of Hector, do not affect the 
outcome of the [Trojan] War they are minor blemishes.
49
  According to C.M. Bowra: 
 The essence of the heroic outlook is the pursuit of honour through action.  The great man is 
 he who, being endowed with superior qualities of body and mind, uses them to the utmost 
 and wins the applause of his fellows because he spares no effort and shirks no risk in his 
 desire to make the most of the gifts and to surpass other men in his exercise of them.
50
   
So, when Agammenon intends to steal the slave girl Briseis from Achilles he is still 
held to be agathos by the men he commands, whether he takes her or not, because 
the term is used in its sociological aristocratic meaning.
51
  Such an escapade will not 
affect Agamemnon‟s ability to fulfil his social status and functions.  As I shall later 
argue, this action was not so well received by Achilles. 
Arete in Homeric times was related to fulfilling one‟s social and professional roles.  
Failure meant the loss of arete, and all other considerations such as courage in battle 
were immaterial if the oikos were overrun.  In war, the agathos is still the most 
effective fighter; and it remains kalon to succeed, aischron to fail.
52
  Thus a king‟s 
arete lies in his ability to command, and a cobbler‟s in his skill at making shoes.  A 
man has arete if he has the arete of his particular social function; for instance, if he is 
a good cobbler he fulfills the telos of making good shoes.
53
  Aside from the central 
and enduring attributions of value captured by the terms agathos and arete, several 
other words were in popular coinage which also indicated forms of worth and value.   
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Another Greek term of value in Homeric times is kalos.  This appears never to have 
signified any indication of class in Homer.
54
  It was a general predicate of beauty and 
was used of men, women and things, always with the same meaning.
55
  It appears to 
have referred to external physical appearance. Kalos like its already mentioned 
cognate kalon attaches to the thing/person as perceived.  For instance, a woman of 
extreme beauty is kala no matter whether she is cruel to her servants or not.  So long 
as she fulfills her social function she remains kala. 
Most commentators seem to agree that the term esthlos is a synonym for agathos 
relating to excellence of function.
56
  Esthlos is used in the Iliad of a man who could 
execute a good throw.
57
  Again in the Iliad, it was used of horses to mean well 
bred.
58
  Another example of the use of esthlos is when Nestor urged  Agammenon to 
reorganise his troops into fighting units instead of an unruly mass so that he may be 
able to tell who is esthlos and who is kakos.
59
  It will be seen that the terms of worth 
described so far relate only to success in action, or pedigree in breeding.  There is no 
suggestion that they describe personality traits recognisable in the quieter 
cooperative virtues. Kakos is the corresponding word of denigration, in the sense that 
the kakoi do not fulfil their social function.   
Aischron, and its relative elencheie, are derogatory terms.
60
  Elencheie is the state of 
mind of having done something aischron (shameful), it is the condition of an agathos 
who has behaved as a kakos.  This is illustrated when Odysseus says to Agammenon: 
Now the Greeks are willing to make you most contemptible (elenchistos), in the eyes of all 
mortal men; and they will not fulfill the promise which they made when they were still on the 
way here from Greece, that they would return home only when they sacked Troy.
61 
He admits that long campaigns are hard, so that the Greeks are to be excused for 
wanting to go home, but nevertheless maintains that it is aischron to remain a long 
time and return empty handed.
62
  Once again “success” is a central determinant of 
functionality. 
Aischos (the adjective aeikelios, the adverb aeikelios) is used to decry breaches of 
co-operative values.
63
  The effect of its use is to draw attention to the condition of 
anyone being mistreated, such as the serving maids being dragged through the palace 
in the Odyssey.
64
  This seems to intimate that there are behavioural values which run 
 22 
counter to the received “Homeric” view.  Aidos is a word that is closely related to 
defeat and elenchos.  An example is when Hera shouts to the Greeks: 
 Aidos, for shame! Base elenchea.
65
 
These are the key terms of value in Homer‟s Iliad.66   
With the exception of aeikelios none of these terms have any connection with the co-
operative virtues.  In Homeric nobility there is no advancement of human goods 
except by the sociological fulfillment of one‟s situation.  I shall be arguing that 
Homer was mindful of an unexplored dimension to human behaviour and that he 
developed the cooperative virtues in his epics in the advice given by Nestor to 
Agamemnon, Phoenix to Achilles and the sensitivity shown by Achilles to Priam.  
Homer’s Purpose in Writing the Iliad 
I shall argue that it is the aristocratic behavioural fiction that Homer sought to expose 
in the Iliad.  I shall show how the nobles availed themselves of blame-avoiding 
expressions to maintain their social supremacy.  If the aristocrats were to contribute 
meaningfully to human goods in society, they had first to be made to realize that they 
ought to consider themselves part of that society with responsibility to develop the 
co-operative virtues.   
A distinction has to be drawn between Homer‟s intention in writing the Iliad and the 
social conception of Homeric morality, which provides the sociological backdrop to 
the times within which the various episodes of the Iliad unfold.  Homer is teasing out 
the implication of the moral and political disorder of his times, by pointing out the 
ruptures and their causes.  Homer is pointing to a deeper understanding of the ethical, 
and abstracting to an order of timeless reality which is reflected in some of the 
leitmotifs of the Iliad.  Homer achieves this by using vivid imagery and by tracing 
the development of Achilles‟ personality from the sulk he fell into when 
Agamemnon stole Briseis from him until he was jolted out of it when Hector killed 
his cousin Patroclus.  The culmination of Achilles‟ moral development was shown in 
the compassion he displayed for Priam when he risked his life to ask Achilles to 
return Hector‟s body to him.  Before developing these themes, I shall examine some 
of the secondary literature written on the Homeric ethics. 
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My reading of the development of the co-operative virtues in the Iliad appears to be 
at variance with much of the secondary and canonical literature on Homer.  The 
philosophical investigation I am undertaking into the classical texts has not yet been 
done by these authors, or any others that I am able to locate.  However, I am grateful 
to them for their very rich literature, which I have found of enormous assistance.   
Alasdair MacIntyre 
In his book A Short History of Ethics Alasdair MacIntyre deals with what he calls 
The Pre-Philosophical History of “Good” and the Transition to Philosophy in the 
second chapter.
67
  For MacIntyre, the term agathos relates to fulfilment of social 
function, that of the status a person is born into.
68
  MacIntyre correctly observes that 
in the Homeric epics there is no moral evaluation of the relationship between 
motivation and action.  In other words it is a matter of external „show‟.  He says: 
 The alleged logical gulf between fact and appraisal is not so much one that has been 
 bridged in Homer.  It has never been dug.  Nor is it clear there is any ground in which to 
 dig.
69 
MacIntyre goes on to say: 
 And this is to say that Homeric moral predicates are not applied, as moral predicates have 
 been applied in our society, only where the agent could have done other than he  did.
70 
In saying that “the alleged gulf” does not make sense in Homer, MacIntyre offers a 
historicist explanation of the social context in which the terms agathos and arete are 
used in Homer.  MacIntyre does not deal at all with the meeting of Achilles and 
Priam, an encounter which is central to my thesis.  Had he done so, I suggest he 
would have accepted that Achilles could well have acted other than he did.  Achilles 
said as much, as I shall later show.  As I shall demonstrate, it was Achilles‟ free 
choice that made his actions agathoi in the extended sense of the word for which I 
am arguing. 
MacIntyre holds that a man who performs his social function also possesses arete.   
Provided a man is careful enough to perform his social function he cannot lose his 
arete, nor can he be said to cease to be agathos.  MacIntyre sees Homeric society as 
a unified one in which evaluation depends upon established criteria of a family of 
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concepts which presuppose a certain social order.  This social order in Homer is 
characterised by a recognised hierarchy of functions.
71
   
MacIntyre recognised society as functioning well with each person fulfilling his/her 
arete, but stopped short of discussing the gradual drawing out and improvement of 
the inner harmony and excellence of functioning in Homeric individuals.  Whilst 
MacIntyre appears to have contented himself with a historicist account, I argue that 
Homer went beyond a simple narrative of aristocrats acting as fulfilled agathoi 
should and presented us with a morality tale in which virtues within the reach of 
everyone, such as compassion, trumped the “external show” of the aristocratic class.   
E.R. Dodds 
A different approach to Homeric times is taken by E. R. Dodds in his book The 
Greeks and the Irrational.
72
  He is dealing with religion and its psychology in 
Homer.  Once again, however, the view is of traditional Homeric aristocratic values.  
He examines the growth and meaning of the terms ate and moira in the epics, which 
enable the agent to escape responsibility.  For Dodds these terms justify conduct that 
may, without some such explanation, fall short of being agathos.  Thus, when 
Agammenon compensated himself for the loss of his own mistress by robbing 
Achilles of his, he evaded responsibility by saying that the god Zeus had put “wild 
ate”73 in his understanding.74  This was a valid excuse because early Greek justice 
cared nothing for intent – it was the act that mattered.75  The victim takes the same 
view of it as the agent.
76
  This, indeed, is the position that I set myself against.  
Agamemnon is abrogating moral responsibility and thrusting blame onto the gods.
77
  
E. R. Dodds explains that ate means a temporary clouding or bewildering of the 
normal consciousness.
78
   
However, this is not the only way in which the term ate was used.  It involved any 
mental lapse that could be ascribed to the agency of an external daemon or higher 
power, as when Glaucus swapped gold armour for bronze.
79
  In Homer the source of 
ate is often attributed to demonic agency.
80
  This is illustrated in Agammenon‟s 
dream.
81
  Zeus sent a dream to Agammenon to tell him to prepare his Achaean forces 
for battle against the Trojans at once, despite knowing from a previous message of 
the gods that they could not win without Achilles.  Zeus told the dream to assume the 
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identity of Nestor, Agammenon‟s most valued and trusted councillor.  Agammenon 
was under no illusion that he was asleep in his bed, since the dream figure makes 
sure to point this out to him: “you are asleep, son of Atreus,” says the dream figure.82  
The problem presented to the dreamer in Homeric times was whether the dream 
figure was being deceptive or not.  This difficulty is the same one that Glaucus 
underwent and always provides an escape route for the dreamer.  If things don‟t work 
out it is because of the demonic origin or ate in the dreamer.  In effect the dreamer 
claims demonic possession, albeit temporarily, which ensured that the agathos 
maintained his status impact.   
These errors of judgement caused by ate, with the reservations I have described, 
escaped being described as wickedness, or, indeed, any form of moral imperfection.  
The result of ate, a psychological state induced by the gods, is simply a fact of life.  
We can see the beginnings of moral judgements, and bad judgements, in the 
description of ate and its effects.  For the Greeks, ate was a moral buffer between the 
person or agent and the effect of his actions.  Because, as the story goes, he was not 
acting out of free will when in a state of ate, he could not be responsible for anything 
that occurred.   
Another term examined by Dodds is moira which he describes as an inexplicable 
disaster as part of man‟s “portion” or “lot” in life, meaning simply that they cannot 
understand why it happened, but since it has happened, evidently it had to “be.”83  
Moira and ate are not synonyms; however, moira may follow from past actions 
performed while the agent was in a state of ate.  Moreover, Patroclus attributes his 
death directly to an intermediate agent Euphorbus, and indirectly to Apollo, but from 
a subjective standpoint to his bad moira.  Once again, the term moira offers yet 
another source of abrogation of responsibility in the epics.  This runs counter to the 
whole thrust of reasonableness which Homer sets up as a palliative to such thinking.  
This looks forward to the Odyssey when Zeus lamented that it was a bad thing that 
men should blame the gods for their troubles.
84
 
Whilst these terms of justification like ate and moira remained in vogue, every 
human act was a result of divine intervention, for better or worse.  Doing away with 
these linguistic havens would mean that an action would have to be judged according 
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to the amount of human goods it conduced to, much like the samurai sword or the 
kitchen knife.   
This is not to say that the sole function of the divinity was to provide an escape route 
every time an aristocrat committed an act that he felt he needed to excuse.  The gods 
play a very important role in Homer‟s morality tale.  They inhabit a world where 
they are conscious of what is appropriate behaviour in all of the circumstances and at 
all times.  There is no question of their determining the outcome of the development 
of Achilles‟ character – ethos.  Instead they provide moral lessons throughout the 
Iliad to encourage Achilles in his moral development through overcoming his 
implacable rage sufficiently to return to battle right through until he restores 
equilibrium in returning Hector‟s body to Priam.   
An example of the unfolding of Zeus‟ plan is when Euphorbus assists Hector by 
striking Patroclus in the back with a spear.  The dying Patroclus says: 
 Well may you boast now,  
Hector; for Zeus and Apollo have given 
 you victory and have easily overcome me.
85
 
It was the death of Patroclus which jolted Achilles out of his sulking indolence which 
was replaced by another equally negative emotion.  He then redirected his 
uncontrollable rage to vindicating his beloved Patroclus by killing Hector.  It was 
Hector‟s death at the hands of Achilles that led to the fulfilment of Zeus‟ plan when 
Achilles freely returned Hector‟s body to Priam, thus literally “coming back to his 
senses”, being reasonable.  The importance of Achilles‟ compassionate action was 
that it was a completely free choice which is manifest in his words to Priam:  
       Old man, do not drive me too hard.  I have made up my  
         mind without your help to give Hector back to you ... do not  
         exasperate me now, sir, or I may break the laws of Zeus 
         And, suppliant though you are, show you as little consideration  
         as I showed Hector in my tent.
86
 
Dodds does not deal with the terms agathos and arete, but observes that in Homer 
man‟s highest good is the enjoyment of time (honour or public esteem).87  Time is 
important to Helen when she says to Hector of Paris  “Would ... that I had been wife 
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to a better man – to one who could smart under dishonour (atime), and men‟s evil 
speeches.”88  Helen was reflecting on the hesitation of her beloved to follow Hector 
into battle.  Helen could not admire warrior-like qualities in a man who was not 
showing them.  This failing detracted from anything else she may see in Paris as 
meritorious.   
A. W. H. Adkins 
In Adkins, agathos and arete have their normal meaning.
89
  Adkins, together with 
MacIntyre and Dodds, contented themselves with describing the Homeric epics as an 
account of what the aristocratic class thought of itself.  The authors I have been 
discussing accurately capture the historic events of the Iliad.  However, they do not 
emphasise the link between the disintegration of Achilles‟ character wrought by his 
reaction to Agamemnon‟s insult and the healing that took place within him in his 
compassionate response to Priam‟s plea for Hector‟s body.  In these two episodes we 
see a departure from and a returning to the ideal of kalos kagathos.   
Eric Vogelin 
An author more sympathetic to my argument is Eric Vogelin, who argues that the 
epics provide us with a meditation on the sources of disintegration of the Mycenaean 
civilisation.  Homer was not concerned about history simpliciter, nor with creating a 
work of literature, but rather with the Greek experience of order and its 
symbolisation.  He was confronting people with their shortcomings and challenging 
them to mould their character on the timeless excellences around them.  “In 
expressing a new experience of human existence ... of the nature of order and the 
causes of disorder, and of the historical decline and fall of a society ...”,90 Homer 
created a meditation on social order in which moral value is undergirded by a 
cosmological viewpoint which places practical reasonableness at the centre stage.  
One of the literary devices he employs to achieve this is through his dialectic relating 
to scenery and constancy.  It seems that Homer is encouraging people to replicate 




The Scenery of Homer’s Iliad 
Homer develops an impression of the world with the adjectives he uses to describe 
the natural phenomena, such as the fruitful earth,
91
 dawn spreading her saffron 
mantle and the ambrosial mysterious night.
92
  These adjectives not only describe the 
dawn and the night, but become them, and are one with them.  Homer makes these 
qualities transcendental properties of the dawn and the night.  Thus, they become the 
quintessence of their quality and beauty.  Homer is describing the dawn and the night 
in a far deeper and more meaningful and beautiful sense than he does the aristocracy.   
For the most part Homer is content to describe the aristocracy as agathoi and to talk 
of their arete as purely external qualities.  And yet he is continually pointing to the 
ruptures in order associated with the external perspective.  These literary devices 
capture something of the excellence of the cosmos with respect to its order and 
beauty.  The repetition of them is not only an attempt to penetrate people‟s obstinacy 
in revealing their superficial behaviour, but also an invitation to implement timeless 
values in their world.  However, people can in their own way replicate cosmic order 
and beauty in creative activities.  In addition to this, the world which Homer creates 
for his epic poetry to come to fruition is one in which every functional object can be 
excellently made.
93
  The ships are always well benched, seaworthy and fine,
94
 the 
armour always well fitting and shining.
95
  The spear is always straight, stout, long 
and sharp,
96
 it fulfils the excellence of the kind of thing it is, its purpose.
97
  This 
complete Homeric setting implies a perfection that pervades the whole of the created 
order.  The world as Homer presents it is a poetic embellishment designed to 
encourage improved behaviour.   
It is in sharp contrast to the aristocratic world and the exculpatory linguistic devices 
the nobles have set up for themselves.  Viewed against the backdrop of the aesthetic 
qualities of nature‟s patterns, the aristocrats appear to be lacking the consistent and 
uncompromising qualities that nature reflects.  They tend to give the impression of 
the kitchen knife in the museum of horrors, effective in the carnage of killing, but 
apart from that, not contributing to human goods at all.   
Homer‟s well-ordered world is portrayed to us through nature and inanimate things.  
Nature contains patterns of order that people ought not to interfere with and is an 
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ever present reminder of the excellence of reality which may serve as a paradigm for 
both individual and social excellence for humans.  Homer depicts the cosmic beauty 
in phrases like the Heavenly Dawn,
98
 the cranes that fly from the onset of Winter,
99
 
the gods drinking nectar from tankards of gold,
100
 and the Star of Summer rising 
from his bath in the ocean to outshine all other stars.
101
 It is perfectly proportioned, 
and, as Homer continues to remind us, very often beautiful beyond description.  It is 
Homer‟s mission to show us that we can achieve the same harmony in our individual 
and social lives.   
The inanimate objects in Homer seem to be made according to the pattern of nature.  
They are the best that Greek patience and skill (techne) can produce.  The Greeks 
well knew that in order for something to achieve its telos (purpose for which it was 
made), it had to be well-constructed, it had to have arete (excellence), in so far as it 
is the kind of thing it is.  Thus excellence is an attribution of worth which coincides 
with the term agathos.  For the Greeks of Homeric times arete meant goodness and 
excellence of any kind, which included “of animals, things, and land ...”102  These 
things, including ships and spears and all other tools and utensils, are made by man 
as well as he is able so that their arete combined with the arete of the maker 
produces the best work.  The implements were constructed by the craftsman after a 
deep and practical consideration of achieving the ends they were designed to meet.  It 
is most unlikely that this degree of excellence would have been accomplished during 
the first attempt.  This bespeaks tenacity and perfectionism, and also a continual 
refinement of vision as to the best way of producing the most effective artefact for 
the job.  This is the same process that brought into being the well-made kitchen knife 
which shows that the Greeks already had a profound appreciation of beauty in things 
they created.  It was the attention to detail and frequent repetition of this imagery that 
Homer hoped would encourage the aristocracy to look inward, and upon which  
model their moral development.   
So far I have considered several of the authors contributing to the secondary 
literature concerning Homer and have attempted to show how the key terms of value, 
idyllic scenery and artefacts were used in Homeric times.  I now move on to the 
central issues in the Iliad.   
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The cause of the Trojan War, the central issue in the Iliad, was brought about by 
Helen deserting Menelaus for Paris.  The Greek ideal had been abandoned.    Helen‟s 
conduct was improper in several respects.  It caused a deep personal loss for 
Menelaus.  It ruptured a family which was the smallest and most socially stable unit 
in aristocratic society.  It was an affront to Menelaus‟ status as agathos.  Because the 
family was a royal family the rupture Helen‟s conduct produced extended to the 
entire social fabric of the Achaean kingdom.   
In what follows I would like to explore how Homer presents us with a meditation on 
the sources of personal and social disintegration through the leading stories in the 
Iliad, i.e:  
(1) Paris‟ elopement with Helen of Argos;  
(2) Achilles‟ rage after Agammenon steals one of his prizes, which leads to the 
 death in battle of his beloved, Patroclus; and 
(3) Achilles‟ compassion. 
A key set of issues drive the stories contained in the epics.  These are: 
(1) the development of virtue within the agent himself; 
(2) the importance of practical reasonableness; 
(3)  the opposition of individual desire (the hyper moron principle) versus 
 conduct that conduces to communal well-being, and from the gods‟ point of 
 view; and 
(4) the patterns of disorder at the level of society which are an affront to them 
 and the cosmic order.   
I shall attempt to show how these stories will open up a new and extended dimension 
of human behaviour against which people‟s actions may be judged.   
The Elopement 
It is the elopement that causes the outbreak of the war.  Helen had put her personal 
agenda of passion over duty to her family.
103
  Helen‟s passion is represented by the 
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goddess Aphrodite, which should not deter us from ascribing it fully to Helen herself.  
Ruth Padell tells us that “Ate from Aphrodite made Helen run to Troy.  Consequence: 
widespread war.”104 For Padell “ate marks inner movement, for harm which cannot 
be seen, but can be inferred from the outward harm it causes.”105  In all of the 
elements of Helen‟s elopement we see the dangerous consequences caused by people 
who adopt individualistic perspectives to the detriment of their social and familial 
obligations.   
Menelaus had no choice but to wage war on Troy and vindicate himself by killing 
Paris.  This was caused by the lack of reasonableness brought about by the 
interference of Paris in the life of Helen and Menelaus.  It caused a rent in society 
that was to tear two countries apart for over nine years of warfare.  It also involved 
the gods because it was an attack on the divinely ordained conception of the 
communal value of xenia.   
Xenia is a friendly relationship that is characterised by a relationship towards an 
outsider, in connection with someone from a distant place.  Both Paris and Helen 
violated that friendly relationship by their elopement.
106
  Paris and Helen were never 
punished or brought to account for their elopement nor could they be.  Unless Helen 
stayed with Paris in Troy, the combative environment in which Achilles‟ conversion 
took place could never have happened.  Paris realised that it was largely due to his 
actions that the war had begun and decided to challenge Menelaus to single armed 
combat to bring it to a finish.  No harm was done to Paris, even though he lost the 
battle.  Just in time Athene whisked him away from the battle scene as Menelaus was 
getting the better of him.
107
  They lived happily ever after.  They escaped after the 
Achaeans invaded Troy and razed it to the ground.   
The social rupture caused by Paris and Helen became for Homer the literary device 
in which Homer drew out and refined the deeper human virtue of compassion.  
Homer separated the beautiful and the good in order for greater harmony amongst all 
levels of society to develop.  The beautiful and the good remained divided until 
Priam‟s historic encounter with Achilles in his tent.   
The rupture caused by Paris and Helen was felt at all levels in society.  This was the 
stage upon which he was to have the aristocrat protagonists play out his morality tale.  
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Agamemnon was to steal Bresies from Achilles and to suffer the indignity of having 
Achilles reject his overture for peace between the two men.  Homer draws out the 
same theme of a lasting quarrel in this dispute and only turns the tide of Achilles‟ 
sulkiness by killing off Patroclus, thus causing Achilles in his anger to slay Hector.  
In this way Homer replaces one negative emotion with another in his build up to a 
demonstration of one of the most important and refined of human virtues: 
compassion.  Had Homer permitted Achilles to accept Agamemnon‟s overtures of 
gift and apology, the war may well have taken a different course, but the morality 
tale would have been over.
108
  However, in Agamemnon‟s overture we see the 
agathos considering that his behaviour had been wanting.  He was prepared to accept 
that he had wronged Achilles.  He had put the war effort in jeopardy for the sake of a 
brief dalliance. 
The Quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles 
The next story in Homer‟s morality tale concerns the quarrel between Achilles and 
Agammenon.  Their feud weakens the Greek army because Achilles refuses to fight.  
Achilles‟ beloved Patroclus is killed by Hector, who Achilles later kills in revenge.  
It is the death of Patroclus that spurs Achilles back into the fray, not because Achilles 
thinks it is appropriate behaviour, but because of an excess of rage with Hector and 
grief for his beloved.  This causes him to reconcile with Agammenon and continue 
with the war.
109
   
The characters of the Iliad all had a fine sense of justice between themselves, as is 
shown when Agammenon intends to steal the slave girl Briseis from Achilles.  
Nestor says to him: 
Agammenon.  Forget the privilege of your rank, and do not rob him [Achilles] of the girl.  
The Army gave her to him: let him keep his prize.
110
 
Nevertheless Agamemmon steals Briseis, which is a selfish and unreasonable act.  
He ought to have known that individual desire, if not curbed in accordance with 
communal well-being, causes social dissension, because he had just seen an example 
of it in the elopement of Paris and Helen.  Again, Achilles should not have sulked the 
way he did over his loss because in so doing he put the lives of his men in jeopardy.  
In withdrawing into himself he turned his back on the obligations of his status.  
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Because of his rank, this affected not only the members of the fighting forces but 
also their families at home.   
While the secondary commentators I have been discussing see this story as being 
explained in terms of ate, menos and moira, it is clear that Homer is advocating the 
need for the agent to focus on a socially responsible view of things.  One indication 
of this occurs when Nestor hints very strongly that there is a broader dimension to 
the status of agathos than the external one which, if violated, will cause social and 
internal chaos for the agent and the other person at whom the unreasonable conduct 
is aimed.   
Nestor not only addresses Agammenon personally but brings in the social dimension 
of the situation by reminding him that “the army gave her to him.”111  Agammenon 
has the arete of his particular social function and is thus agathos, but Nestor‟s 
exhortation not to deprive Achilles of his prize presages the presence of a future 
ingredient in the term agathos, that of justice, which must also be tied to an account 
of reasonableness.   
In Nestor‟s plea to Agammenon, Homer shows that he will be guilty of going beyond 
the measure and acting hyper moron.  Agamemnon is forgetting that in order to 
command others he must have sufficient mastery of himself not to cause social 
dissension.  Agammenon is about to violate that principle, which is to act hyper 
moron.  This expression relates to those who through their own fault add to their own 
destined share of misery,
112
 and is derived from the word moros meaning destiny or 
fate.
113
  Hyper is a preposition, which when used with the accusative case as it is in 
the expression hyper moron, means over or beyond.  The expression is frequently 
used in Homer.
114
  The use of this term by Homer further illustrates his just and 
temperate view on morality.  If a person acts hyper moron he will be increasing his 
misery because he will be interfering with not only his own equilibrium, but also 
with that of society around him.  His function as a human being will be less than it 
could have been and it will be his own fault.  
Paris’ Cowardice 
I have been attempting to show that we must look beneath the superficial meaning of 
the text of the Iliad to discover Homer‟s moral lessons.  However, there are some 
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obvious examples of conduct in the Iliad similar to the ones I presented in the 
opening chapter of this thesis.  One of them is Hector‟s criticism of his brother Paris.  
Paris was challenged to battle by Menelaus, and avoided the encounter.  Hector 
chided him because of his lack of courage: 
How the long-haired Achaeans must laugh when they see us make a champion of a prince 
because of his good looks, forgetting that he has no strength of mind, no courage, one who 
was hanging his head in shame.
115
  
Hector was haranguing Paris for his cowardliness in his poor performance in his fight 
with Menelaus.  Courage and cowardice are mutually exclusive choices and it is the 
choice that makes man agathos or shameful (aischron).   
Before he went into battle Paris was a true agathos.  However, after escaping with 
his life in a cowardly flight, Paris was aidos.  This is similar to the kitchen knife that 
will not cut.  It looks the part and it is in its appropriate environment, the kitchen, but 
it fails to fulfil the telos of a good knife.  Implicitly, through Homer‟s eyes, Hector is 
pointing out that to be agathos is much more than having a certain social standing.  It 
requires a motivational structure to behave in a certain way for good reasons.   
Phoenix’s Advice to Achilles 
Another example is found in Phoenix‟s advice to Achilles.  This is the first time that 
the question of whether virtue can be taught arises in Greek history.  Phoenix is 
trying to get Achilles to reconcile with Agammenon.  He commends Achilles to 
“keep a check on that proud spirit of yours; for a kind heart is a better thing than 
pride.  Quarrels are deadly.  Be reconciled at once; and all the Argives young and old 
will look up to you the more.”116   
Phoenix was aware that going beyond the measure breaks the bond that ties human 
order to cosmic and divine paradigms. Phoenix knows that Achilles is capable of 
behaving better.  The justification for his rebuke is obvious and there is no need to 
delve beneath the obvious story line in this exchange.  Here again I draw a parallel 
with the kitchen knife that is being used inappropriately; i.e. as a murder weapon.  It 
is out of place in its false setting.   
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Odysseus’ Treatment of Thersites 
A further example of inappropriate behaviour is to be found in the treatment of 
Thersites by Odysseus.  Thersites was a bandy-legged little man, the ugliest foot 
soldier in the army.  Thersites‟ physical appearance is not without significance.  
Every other attribute of Homeric aristocratic life enjoyed perfect external beauty.  
Thersites‟ ugliness clashes with the otherwise perfect setting in which Homer was 
casting his morality tale.  Thersites was continually criticising Achilles and 
Odysseus.  On one occasion he reproaches Agammenon for always wanting more 
booty: “My lord, ... what more do you want?  Your huts are full of bronze, and since 
we always give you the first pick when a town is sacked, you have plenty of choicest 
women in them too ... it ill becomes you as our general to lead the army into trouble 
through such practices.”117 
Odysseus reprimanded him saying, “Thersites, this may be eloquence but we have 
had enough of it.  It is not for you ... to hold forth with the king‟s name on your 
tongue”.  Odysseus then silenced Thersites by whacking him on the back with the 
royal sceptre.  Thersites was censored because he was not agathos.  What irritated 
Odysseus was that he thought Thersites was correct.  Usually Homer gives lessons to 
the aristocracy from on high, from the gods.  His purpose in doing so from a lowly 
soldier on this occasion is a further refinement to his attack upon the bastion of 
agathia monopolised by the aristocracy.  Here Homer uncovers a curious paradox.  
He permits Thersites to reprimand his social betters and even makes Odysseus 
acknowledge his eloquence.  Then he makes Odysseus silence Thersites by violence 
using the royal sceptre, the symbol of the full force of the nobility.  In this exchange 
one sees the small, but very bright, spark of the beginnings of freedom of speech 
acknowledged by Odysseus whilst he holds the supreme authority of the royal 
sceptre in his hand.  Odysseus shows no reasonableness in his treatment of Thersites; 
however, his actions are predictable. To anyone but an aristocratic agathos 
Odysseus‟ conduct would have appeared out of place.  On the face of it Thersites 
was raising a perfectly valid objection to the war being continued.  At least he 
deserved an answer, or would have deserved one, had he raised his objection in times 




The issues raised in this thesis also pertain to the richer ontology that embraces the 
divine order in the Homeric epics.  I have traced: 
(a) the moral growth of people in the Iliad; 
(b) how this moral growth replicates a conception of order (kosmos) that 
 embraces the excellence of each natural/manufactured element of the 
 Achaean/Trojan world; and   
(c) that this conception of order has been tied to a notion of human excellence 
 which Homer develops, a rejection of modes of abrogation of responsibility 
 ate and moira and to the use of reason through rejection of the
 behavioural excesses hyper moron and hubris; 
However, the gods too play their role in this.  In the Iliad the Homeric gods are 
represented as  subject to similar levels of passion, disruption and disorder as in the 
world of human affairs.  Indeed, disorders of individuals and disorders of society are 
reflected in disorder among the gods, and vice versa.  Wender tells us that the gods 
of the Iliad are: 
 Not perhaps very admirable ethically (they lie, cheat, steal, manhandle each other, play 
 favourites and commit adultery rather more than humans do).
118
   
Even so, the gods paved the way for Achilles‟ character to burgeon into compassion.  
This divine intervention was to continue to a greater extent in Homer‟s second epic, 
the Odyssey. 
In the Odyssey, Homer begins a meditation on a new theology by having the gods 
discuss people‟s future development.  Throughout the Iliad people had blamed the 
gods for evil things that befell him, or they evaded responsibility by attributing their 
unseemly behaviour to the gods.  The new Jovian order articulated at the beginning 
of the Odyssey reflects Homer‟s penetrating critique of the sources of personal and 
social disorder in the Iliad.
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After the Trojan War, order (kosmos) had in large part been restored among the 
Achaeans “all the survivors of the war had reached their homes by now and so put 
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the perils of battle and the sea behind them.”120  Only Odysseus was prevented from 
returning to his home and family in Ithaca by the goddess Calypso.  Odysseus was 
imprisoned on Calypso‟s island presided over by Poseidon, the sea god.  Poseidon 
had sworn to  “pursue the heroic Odysseus with relentless malice to the day when he 
reached his own country.”121  Odysseus was temporarily on safe, dry land and thus 
free from harassment by Poseidon, but this represented only a temporary haven.  The 
price of his safety was imprisonment by Calypso who puts her infatuation for 
Odysseus above his right to choose liberty for himself.
122
  Odysseus‟ plight 
represented an imperfection in the divine order, particularly when viewed from the 
perspective of the council of the gods.
123
  Calypso was displaying the hyper moron 
principle in detaining Odysseus for her own pleasure.  
In the opening of the Odyssey a council was convened of all the gods, except 
Poseidon who had gone to Ethiopia.  The purpose of the council was to make people 
responsible for their fate and not attribute blame for their actions to the gods.
124
  It 
was Zeus‟ intention to put an end to people being able to escape responsibility by 
such manoeuvres captured in our earlier discussion of “ate” and “moira”.  In 
addressing the council he highlighted Agammenon‟s return home from the Trojan 
War: 
 What a lamentable thing it is that men should blame the gods and regard us as the source of 
 their troubles, when it is their own wickedness that brings them sufferings worse than any 
 which destiny allots them.
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Athena then asserted that Aegisthus received the fate that he deserved and consigned 
all who act like him to a similar fate.
126
  Aegisthus had known full well that the habit 
of laying blame on the gods was not going to work.  Common sense and Hermes 
enabled Aegisthus to foresee a very predictable consequence of his actions.  Once 
again we see the aristocratic verbal defences providing little protection in the royal 
ranks.    
Aegisthus had defied the gods and thus defiled the divine order.  Athena judged 
Aegisthus‟ actions as having been his own, and, in so doing, hints at a retrospective 
judgement of all of the occasions during the Iliad when people had sought to evade 
responsibility for their evil deeds by projecting the cause of them onto the gods.  
Athena then put forward Odysseus‟ cause.127  In appealing for Odysseus‟ freedom 
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from Calypso, Athena calls him “the wise but unlucky ... who has been parted so 
long from all his friends.”128  This was a new beginning for the gods and humankind.  
Aegisthus, who ignored the divine sanction against committing an act that would rent 
the fabric of the created order, is no more.  His hubris and violation of the hyper 
moron principle has brought him to his fate which cannot be undone.  The linguistic 
defences of the Iliad were a thing of the past.  Whilst Odysseus is still alive “but 
unlucky” he is still redeemable and does not deserve a fate different from the other 
warriors who are safe at home with their families.  His journey home, beset by all the 
hardships the gods could put in his way, will afford him the opportunity of blaming 
them or using the obstacles as stepping stones to character building.  Odysseus made 
the latter choice.     
Odysseus’ Return to Ithaca 
Odysseus‟ desire to return home provides the leitmotif for the gods to assist people in 
working out the new theology in which people take responsibility for their fate 
instead of evading that responsibility by ascribing his actions to the gods.  This 
ushers in the inclusion of man‟s nature into Homer‟s created order, which is not only 
beautiful to behold but also reflects excellence of function.  Odysseus‟ desire to 
return home is the beginning of his awareness of the importance of the cooperative 
virtues. He has always been kalos because of his membership of the aristocracy, but 
he can only become agathos in the sense of the term Homer developed in Achilles by 
restoring order within himself, his family and his kingdom.  In order to command he 
must first learn to replicate cosmic order.   
Throughout the Odyssey Odysseus is obedient to the gods, as when he “leaves the 
animals untouched.”129  Odysseus does not disobey any of their commands on his 
journey and pays attention when Circe warns him to steer clear of certain dangers.
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Circe tells him to ... “fix your mind on getting home ... you may yet reach Ithaca ... 
but not in comfort.”131  The journey home is symbolic of the hero having aspired to 
great deeds and now returning home to share his new found personal development 
with his family and community.
132
  The gods assist him through his trial and 
tribulations, but it is clear that the decisions he takes on his journey home are of his 
own free will.  It is significant that Odysseus does not blame the gods for any set-
backs he has to undergo on his journey.  Seen in this light the intercession of the 
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gods inspiring and illuminating the way home is also an active participation in the 
cosmic order.  Odysseus must often interrupt his journey, but his goal is always 
before him.
133
  He is following the ideal of kalos kagathos. 
The conception of order that I traced in the unfolding of the morality tale in the Iliad 
is fully developed in the Odyssey.  Odysseus‟ journey home is full of constant 
reminders that he is responsible for his own actions, such as when he chooses to stay 
with Circe for a whole year.
134
  He had to be reminded by his men “master if you are 
ever going to escape ... it is high time you thought of Ithaca again.”135  The use of the 
word “escape” hints at an inner reformation; a making over of his order of priorities.   
In staying with Calypso Odysseus was indulging a selfish dalliance which was 
destructive of the familial order he as a father and owner of large estates ought to 
represent.  The beautiful and the good were coming apart.  There was a curious 
parallel between Odysseus‟ conduct and what was happening at home in Ithaca.  
Penelope was beleaguered by unwanted suitors who had taken up residence in 
Odysseus‟ house and were laying his estate to waste.  In addition to this, they were 
abusing members of his family and his servants.  This situation was only possible 
because Odysseus was absent.  Whilst Odysseus was intent on his journey home, he 
was heading towards restoring the social and political order in Ithaca, and his single-
mindedness was also developing human excellence in his own character.  Odysseus 
had no need to escape from Circe because he was her guest and he chose to remain 
with her.  He did, however, need to escape from the complacency into which he had 
sunk.  He needed to stop violating the hyper moron principle.  Circe‟s company was 
pleasant.  He and his men had all the comforts of the flesh, continual “feasting on 
meat galore and mellow wine.”136  We are reminded of other physical enticements 
when Odysseus “went to the beautiful bed where Circe lay.”137  Odysseus had 
allowed himself to be sidetracked.   
After he took leave of Circe, the gods allowed Odysseus to be tempted in many ways 
along his journey.  Firstly, by way of irresponsibility, secondly in the form of sex.  
The Sirens tried to make Odysseus forget Ithaca and his wife Penelope, and tempted 
him into staying with them and giving up his ties to home and family and country.  
Circe and Calypso boasted their superiority to Penelope, and even offered Odysseus 
immortality if he would stay with them as a kind of captive lover.  The third form of 
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temptation, violence, was exemplified in the Cyclops.
138
  The Cyclopes were sub-
human creatures whose interest in Odysseus did not go beyond destroying him and 
his men.  These temptations representing irresponsibility, sex and violence are 
typical dangers confronting people in the world and are among the principal causes 
of disharmony in the created order.
139
  They must be overcome and extirpated if the 
moral growth of people is to develop in the created order.  
In the new theology set up by the Odyssey we see Homer dealing in abstract qualities 
that are a constant call to people to model their behaviour on the patterns of nature 
and divine order.  He does this by using mythological language and rich imagery to 
convey the abstract terms of goodness (agathia) and justice (dikaiosyne), in the 
excellence of the world he creates.  The excellences of the world people inhabit 
exhibits a perfection that is embedded in an ontology of order which is reminiscent 
of the divine.  In this new theology both people and the gods become inseparably 
committed to the establishment of divinely created order, which is reflected in the 
triumphant homecoming of Odysseus, his slaying of the suitors, and his restoration 
of social and political order in Ithaca.  This restitution of social stability brought 
about by Odysseus with divine help reflects the beauty present in orderly human 
conduct and assists people to appreciate the human goods which such interaction –  
not only between individuals, but also various social classes – can bring into being.  
Such an idyllic state of behaviour frees people up to devote their energies to fruitful 
enterprises instead of having to waste energy upon being forever on guard against 
aggressive behaviour in others.  Odysseus‟ return to Ithaca restored the order that had 
been lost when Paris and Helen went on a frolic of their own. The kitchen knife was 
back in the kitchen. 
In this chapter I have shown how Homer developed the cooperative virtues out of the 
chaos of adultery and warfare. This journey of Achilles‟ character was Homer‟s 
contribution to the first step in the pursuit of the ideal of kalos kagathos.  Homer 
included the involvement of the gods in the aspiration of people to the Greek ideal by 
assisting Odysseus to arrive home in Ithaca.  That his journey was arduous and 
fraught with obstacles shows how difficult pursuit of the Greek ideal is.  His arrival 





The marriage of the beautiful and the good receives further elaboration in the 
writings of Hesiod, in that Hesiod democratises the notion of kalos kagathos, 
rejecting its aristocratic pedigree by emphasising that there are excellences among 
the agrarian and peasant classes.  The setting of Hesiod‟s farming community was 
very different from the affluence and unchanging natural splendor that provided a 
divine backdrop to the flourishing of aristocratic society.  Hesiod‟s people toiled in a 
land that did not easily yield a living.
140
  Both respect and worldly success had to be 
hard-won.  I shall now discuss some of the terms of behavioural value Hesiod uses 
and how he employs them to weave moral lessons into his poetry.   
Hesiod wrote roughly contemporaneously with Homer.
141
  While Homer produced 
epics designed as a meditation on the sources of disorder with remedies for such 
disorder, the poets in Boeotia where Hesiod lived produced works that dealt with 
topics such as “farming, ethics and metal work.”142  These were handbooks 
prescribing general forms of behaviour for the agrarian community.  They embodied 
a series of directives for an orderly existence.  I am confining myself to the Theogony 
and Works and Days.
143
   Whilst the Theogony deals with order in the world of the 
gods, Works and Days “is really one long hymn to work and prudence.”144   
Hesiod wishes to educate “good advisors”145 and hopes that people will avail 
themselves of good advice.
146
  He speaks of various crafts in the marketplace and 
thus he apparently contemplates some sort of apprentice system in which one may 
learn a craft by a long association with one already proficient in it.
147
  This type of 
education inheres in the relationship between craftsman and pupil and is more 
intimate than that of neighbour and neighbour because it involves turning the 
apprentice into a good craftsman.  The contribution of the master to the community 
and to the education of the pupil is twofold.  First, he makes it possible for the pupil 
to earn his living and thus not be a burden on the community, and secondly, he 
improves the community by adding to it a competent craftsman.  In this healthy 
competition, which Hesiod refers to as good eris,
148
 we see people striving to better 
themselves and contribute to human goods by increasing the efficiency of how tasks 
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are accomplished.  Once again we see the function of the kitchen knife being 
improved.   
Just as Homer employed key terms of value, so did Hesiod.  The essential difference 
in the Hesiodic world was that there were no fictive excuses.  The only road to 
success was hard work.  No one had it as a birth-right. 
An Analysis of the Terms Arete, Panaristos, Dike and Other Related Terms of 
Value in Hesiod. 
Arete in Hesiod is related to work.  A man has arete when his work produces 
discernible reward.  For Hesiod, the work is a means to a certain standing in the 
agrarian community.  This recalls the “outward show” of Homer to the extent that a 
man of arete will be recognised by the fulfillment of his social station.  However, 
Hesiod adds the idea that a man of arete must go about his work in a prudent 
manner.  It must be apparent that the work will produce success in the form of honest 
and planned gain, otherwise the work will be in vain, and not attended by arete – it 
will be achreios.  The return need not only be in money, but the work must be 
capable of producing the telos it is aimed at; it must be done in the correct season and 
skillfully.  In this sense, the work conforms with the patterns of cosmic order.  Thus, 
Hesiod works backwards from the external results of accumulated riches, to the 
central and enduring attributions of value in the work that produced them.  He says: 
 But  
 if you work, the idle will envy you as you grow  
 rich, for fame and renown (arete) attend on wealth.
149
 
Here, Hesiod uses arete to include “fame and renown” in his Works and Days.  It is 
the useful member of his agrarian community that is the man of arete.  Here the arete 
is present in the “fame and renown” that the work has produced.  It is the arete of 
working people,
150
 which, as I shall argue, goes beyond the external aspects of arete 
depicted in Homer.  Hesiod‟s working people must aim at being panaristos, which 
implies living a balanced life across the entire spectrum of their existence.    
In praising the man who aims to make himself panaristos, Hesiod is directing his 
reader to establish excellence within him/herself.  Aristos means best
151
 and is used 
in conjunction with proportion (kairos)
152
 when Hesiod is giving investment advice 
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regarding the shipping of only a portion of one‟s goods, the reward of one‟s labour.  
Hesiod makes practical reasonableness synonymous with proportion when he says  
“proportion is best in all things”.153  A man cannot return a profit on every 
speculative enterprise. However, provided he invests wisely, and is generally 
successful, he will still be a man of arete.  Wise investing involves the notion that 
one should not risk financial ruin.  Even if one were successful on several occasions, 
an informed member of his community would not consider him to be a man of arete.  
This is because it would simply be a matter of time before such behaviour would 
bring him undone.  Practical reasonableness must be apparent in everything people 
do, and whilst he may be thought to be a man of arete in his craft he will lose that 
characteristic distinction if he is, for example, unwarrantedly rude in company
154
 or 
deports himself as an uncaring family man.
155
  These overarching behavioural 
excellences look forward to Aristotle‟s megalopyschos (great-souled man). 
Panaristos is the most important key designation of moral worth in Hesiod.  It means 
best of all and appears once
156
 in Hesiod to describe a man who considers all things 
for himself, and then acts.
157
  This includes his trade or calling, or his social or 
familial dealings.  The use of panaristos occurs in the text as part of Hesiod‟s 
haranguing of Perses for having demonstrated a wayward character in cheating him 
(Hesiod) out of his inheritance.   In this further development of the approach to 
practical reasonableness, Hesiod says: 
 That man is all together best (panaristos) who considers all things himself and marks 
 what will be better afterwards and at the end.
158 
Here Hesiod hints at a sense of telos: what is being aimed at.   Hesiod considers 
nothing should be done to excess.  Being a workaholic would stifle growth in other 
areas such as family life.  Such a man would no longer merit the designation, 
panaristos.  The implication is that there are dimensions to human flourishing that 
require a plural account of goods and the development of prudential considerations in 
respect to balancing these goods.    Hesiod always concentrates on the individual‟s 
development.
159
  This appears from the personal nature of his address to his readers.  
Hesiod‟s panaristos, like kalos kagathos, is an ideal to be striven for.  Each effort 
betters the individual and his community.  Hesiod‟s focus on the amelioration of 
each human being is a non-utilitarian approach because he is not interested in 
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maximizing the well-being of individuals at the expense of any one person.
160
  
Hesiod seems to derive the model for his panaristos from the Homeric agathos 
because he says that the panaristos is all together best.
161
   
Hesiod further distinguishes between the panaristos and the man who “listens to a 
good advisor”,162 whom he designates as good (esthlos).  Hesiod seems to be the 
only panaristos in his community that can be identified because it is from him that 
all the farming and ethical advice he gives to his community comes.  
Another key attribute of moral work in Hesiod is deilos
163
 which means worthless.  
Hesiod uses this terms of “A worthless man who makes now one, and now another 
his friend.”164  In the Iliad, deilos means “cowardly.”165  The only way a man could 
lose his worth, or cease to be agathos was to act in a cowardly way.  It had nothing to 
do with making a convenience of friends.  Hesiod‟s use of the word denotes a loss of 
worth that is tied to constancy of character, and thus goes beyond external behaviour.  
This can be seen in the shift in meaning of deilos between the Iliad and the Works 
and Days.  Friendship is highly valued in the Hesiodic community.  Without it 
communal flourishing would not be possible.  The word deilos could also extend to 
the dilettante who flits from one craft to another without ever mastering any.
166
  Such 
a man deprives himself of the experience necessary to perfect his trade, thus reducing 
his own capacities together with his ability to contribute to the betterment of the 
community.
167
  He would also risk becoming a burden on the community because of 
the possibility of being unable to adequately maintain himself or his family if his 
half-hearted ventures were to fail.  Thus Hesiod, inspired as he is with the traditional 
farming lifestyle, promotes the practical value of avoiding being deilos. 
Esthlos is used in two senses in the Works and Days.  Firstly it is used of the 
prosperous (esthloi).  When Hesiod is calling Perses he says: 
 Listen to right (dike) and do not foster violence (hubris): for violence is bad for a poor 
 man.  Even the prosperous cannot easily bear its (hubris) burden, but is weighed down 
 under it  when he has fallen into delusion.
168
   
In this sense there is an affinity between the notions of arete and esthlos in that the 
worker who possesses arete has some material things to show for it.  The other 
occasion on which esthlos is found is concerned with the taking of counsel: 
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And he, again, is good (esthlos) who listens to a good advisor.
169 
Typically in Homer, good advisors were not heeded, leading to great disruptions of 
order.  So included in the common attributes of the esthlos in Hesiod are these 
further qualities of achieving material gain in a workmanlike and prudent manner 
together with the developed capacity to listen and benefit from wise counsel.  In this 
sense Hesiod is progressing beyond the model of self-sufficiency extolled in the 
received version of Homer.   
Hesiod also uses the term theios as an attribute of worth, meaning scrupulous when 
applied to people.
170
  When counseling modesty in toilet habits he says “These nights 
belong to the blessed gods.  A scrupulous (theios) man who has a wise heart sits 
down, or goes to the wall of an enclosed Court.”171  Hesiod‟s use of theios is a call to 
people to imitate divine excellence to live up to the image in which Epimetheus had 
created them. Edith Hamilton tells us that Epimetheus made men upright like 
gods.
172
  The gods are the authors of the cosmic patterns
173
 and, according to Hesiod, 
scrupulosity will ensure participation in their unerring divinity.
174
  Scrupulosity, 
which appears to have played no part in Homeric society, underpins Hesiod‟s rural 
community.  Hesiod chooses a very basic example in correct toilet habits and 
commends the individual to act with a “wise heart”.  He chooses this example 
because here restraint is a deliberate choice, it being permissible to perform one‟s 
toilet habits in public.  He hopes that restraint at this level will spread throughout 
society encouraging similar concessions from other members of the community, 
thereby contributing to its excellent functioning.  As I have argued, Hesiod‟s 
pragmatic and level-headed approach to morality is deeply tied to a concern for 
practical reasonableness.  Judging correctly is an essential component of such 
practical reasonableness.  When Hesiod migrated to Boeotia he must have found 
farmers using methods that lacked efficiency and working contrary to nature.  Works 
and Days is one long exhortation to successful work/farming by copying nature‟s 
patterns and imitating cosmic excellences.    
Krinon means judging
175
 and is used by Hesiod in the sense of following nature:. 
“[He who] does his work without offending the deathless gods, who „discerns 
(krinei) the omens’ of birds and avoids transgression.”176  The gods endow the birds 
with certain attributes, which if followed by people, will enable them to follow 
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nature‟s patterns as the birds do.  Thus, by discerning the divine order in nature, man 
conforms to it in his own moral order, and also in his relationship with nature.  
Enmeshed in the birds‟ behaviour is their ability to function excellently on account of 
their divine design.  Hesiod calls some of their actions “omens”, which are 
manifestations of the divine design (dike) in the world.  This supernatural pattern 
appears to look forward to the Platonic Forms or Ideas.
177
  I shall be arguing that dike 
may be interpreted as meaning “way” and is thus synonymous with the cosmic order.  
Beauty consists in the orderly function of the created order, and its inhabitants.
178
   
Hesiod uses key terms not only to describe excellences from the slant of 
reasonableness, but also contrasts them with their contraries such as achreios which 
is a derogatory term.  It means useless or unprofitable.
179
  It occurs once in Hesiod 
and is used of people‟s mental activities, whether vocational or social180:  
But whoever neither thinks for himself nor keeps in mind what another tells him, he is an 
 unprofitable man (achreios).
181  
Immediately following this statement, Hesiod says to Perses: 
 But you at any rate, always remembering my charge, work, high-born Perses, that Hunger 




Hesiod sees the need to put his brother on the right track as he has sought to acquire  
riches by dishonest means.  Hesiod is trying to convince Perses to contribute to the 
harmony of the agrarian community by becoming a useful member of it through that 
which unites its members.  To be achreios is to oppose the virtue of being 
panaristos.  Another denigratory term used by Hesiod is aegros which means idle or 
not working,
183
 and Hesiod reminds us that “Both Gods and man are angry with a 
man who lives idly.”184  Again Hesiod says,“Work is no disgrace; it is idleness which 
is a disgrace.”185 
Aidos in Homer was closely related to defeat, whereas in Hesiod it relates to a man 
who falls into need because he will not work.
186
  Anaideia means shamelessness
187
 
and is used by Hesiod to decry the man who gains wealth by dishonour (anaideia) 
and by deceit (exapatao).
188
  These two terms are faults which strike as the very core 
of human behaviour, because they undermine the integrity of Hesiodic society.   
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In contrasting these terms of conduct, Hesiod is defining the extremes out of which 
cooperative virtue may emerge.  In the received account of Homeric morality, being 
agathos in the aristocratic sense of the word suffices.  In Hesiod‟s world a man 
cannot achieve “fame and renown” (arete) unless he masters his craft.  He must also 
be a responsible member of the community and his family, through the exercise of 
virtues markedly different from the received account of the Homeric ones, such as 
generosity: “Give to one who gives, but [do] not give to one who does not give” and  
“Be friends with the friendly and visit him who visits you.”189  Both of these 
commendations undergird the goals of Hesiod‟s rural community and involve 
friendly interaction tied to the practicable reasonableness which requires 
consideration for others.  Hesiod is arguing for teaching by example.  If one were to 
give to people who do not return the favour, one would be encouraging them to 
continue in their antisocial behaviour.  The same considerations apply to visiting.  
The man who takes and does not contribute not only weakens the community, but 
does not develop his own character.  Hesiod was well aware that the community can 
only flourish if each member of it takes responsibility for the quality of his own 
actions in all aspects of his life.  The kitchen knife may well be made of stainless 
steel and have a good cutting edge, but it does not give proper service if the handle is 
badly designed.   
It is noteworthy that Hesiod does not use the term agathos, the central term of 
aristocratic value in the Homeric literature, closely associated with rank.
190
  No one 
in the Hesiodic community enjoyed rank by birth.  Hesiod was struggling to 
elucidate a new concept of human goodness.  Hesiod chose other terms of value, to 
underscore the cooperative virtues and practical reasonableness.   
The Use of Agathos by Theognis 
The first time agathos was used in a moral sense was by Theognis, who is 
foreshadowing the resolution of the tensions in the Greek concept of value; namely, 
“what is agathos?”, which was to be more fully articulated in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle. Theognis clearly spells out the internalist critique of the received account 
of his times in the following: 
 And if good sense could be made and placed in a man, there would never be a base son of a 
 noble (agathos) father, since he would heed words of wisdom.
191 
 48 
For Theognis the whole of arete is summed up in dikaiosyne:  
 Wear yourself out in the pursuit of excellence, let justice be dear to you, and don‟t let any 
 gain that is shameful win you over.
192
 
Again, Theognis claims that anyone who is dikaios is agathos: 
 Every man Cyrnus, is agathos if he is dikaios.193 
Here Theognis sums up the messages of Homer and Hesiod.  Theognis‟ true agathos 
needs to be dikaios.  Theognis‟ agathos clearly is closer to that of Hesiod than 
Homer.  In Theognis we see a description of good (agathos) which is overarching.  
Theognis makes the notion of “good” synonymous with the unerring unfolding 
patterns of nature in all their cosmic splendor.  This notion appears to exceed 
Hesiod‟s idea of human perfection which he seems to limit to the panaristos.  Hesiod 
knew that man can never arrive at eternal perfection, but if he continues to think all 
things through for himself he will always improve in all aspects of his life.  He will 
thus continue to contribute to human goods in a way that will ensure constant 
improvement.    
For Hesiod, effort is important.  All men in his community are born equal.  It may 
well be that Hesiod deliberately avoids the central epithet of aristocratic value, 
agathos, for exactly this reason.  Like Homer, his terms which denote internalist 
moral qualities are different from the aristocratic vocabulary.  He even ties 
humankind to the divinity of the gods by the use of the word “scrupulous” (theios), 
and the sharing of the “omens” of the birds (ornithas krinon), again recalling the 
ability of people to share in the ideal cosmic order if he will follow the patterns of 
nature.   
Dike (Justice) 
In the Theogony, Hesiod used genealogy to tie the history of the gods to the order of 
nature.  Hesiod placed the forces of nature in a cosmic context beside the history of 
the dynasties of the gods in his development of the ethical forces of the world.  While 
every ethical force is still described as a divine power, it embraces much more than 




, a concept he develops in his Works & Days
195
,  albeit that it began 
in the Odyssey.
196
   
Perhaps the most important term of value in Hesiod, dike is first found in his 
Theogony.
197
  Dike is one of Zeus‟ daughters through his marriage with Themis.198  It 
is significant that Zeus, one of whose titles is Saviour, would choose the goddess of 
order to manifest the saving qualities he gave the world in his four daughters.  They 
are emanations and a further dimension of order, who could not have been brought 
forth without the marriage with Themis.   
Dike and her siblings Eunomia (order), Horae (hours) and Eirene (peace) mind the 
works of mortal people and thus they belong to the patterns of cosmic order and 
justice.  The functions of these four daughters overlap and are in constant interplay, 
for if they were not no one of them could at any time perform her function.  Dike can 
only function in an orderly environment and in good time.  Dike pervades the 
universe and order on all levels: the divine, the cosmic, the individual and the social.  
According to Pausanias there was a picture of the beautiful Dike dragging the ugly 
Adikiai and beating her with her staff.
199
 
Vogelin suggests that the gods and men have the same origin (homothen gegaasi).
200
  
According to Adkins, “The gods have much more arete, time and strength than a 
man.  Their immortality is the only important difference between men and gods”.201  
These two observations by Vogelin and Adkins would seem to suggest that man can 
become more god-like by increasing his arete and time, although he can never 
achieve their divine status.  When dike is used with the other terms of value in 
Hesiod it assumes an over-arching principle that ought to be present in human 
activities if people are to avoid being achreios (useless).  More than that it points the 
way to people‟s moral fulfillment in a teleological sense.   
Gagarin says the term dike (justice) may be used to describe the institutionalization 
of justice as well as to describe the concept of justice.
202
 I agree with this contention.  
Adkins reminds us that the common thread binding the two uses of the word dike 
together was appreciated by Hesiod.
203
   Gagarin goes on to say that, “Dike does not 
have any general moral sense.”204  I part company with him here.  The virtue of 
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justice in a human being requires balance in all facets of his/her life, both vocational 
and moral.
205
   
Ideally, the legal process ought to ensure that the same moral balance exists 
throughout the community.  It unfolds in a law court which not only enforces correct 
behaviour, but also acts as a mentor of it, by recording its decisions so that the 
community may know what acceptable behaviour is.  Elsewhere, Gagarin says:  
The Works and Days is not a treatise about morality or justice, but rather about prosperity 
 and the necessity of an effective legal process to help achieve it.
206
   
Gagarin appears not to have appreciated the Hesiodic message in the Works and 




Gagarin apparently fails to grasp that prosperity is the teleology of performing one‟s 
craft well.  There is a relation between good work, which takes time to achieve, and 
the accumulation of riches which involves putting the fruit of one‟s labour aside on a 
gradual and regular basis so that “soon the little will become great.”208  Gagarin‟s 
preoccupation with the fruits of labour as an end in itself shows a very superficial 
reading of Hesiod‟s text.  Gagarin fails to appreciate that the little “becoming great” 
refers not only to increased prosperity, but more importantly to improvement in one‟s 
good character and ability in exercising one‟s craft.  
Again he says: 
 The main theme running through the Work and Days is prosperity and how to attain it.209 
It is surprising that Gagarin reaches this view because he sets out the early Greek 
method of litigation and settling disputes at the institutional level with a close eye to 
detail: 
 The process was as follows: when two parties had a dispute over land or other property 
 (cattle, a wife, a murdered kinsman, etc), they could settle the matter by force, bie. If 
 however, they desired a peaceful settlement, dike, but could not agree to a settlement by 
 themselves, they might agree to look for a third, disinterested person to propose a settlement, 
 dikazein.  They might agree to abide by the opinion of a particular judge, dikaspolos, or they 
 might solicit proposals for settlements, dikai, from several people and agree to abide by the 
 one most acceptable to both sides (the “straightest”).  In the process, each litigant might 
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 propose his own settlement (dikazesthai – presumably in his own interest), and this proposal 
 (or plea) would be his dike.  The whole process could also be called a dike, but it differed 
 from our trial in that neither an individual nor the state, in Homeric society at least, could 
 compel anyone to submit to dike.
210 
Gagarin apparently overlooks the many meanings attributed to dike in the foregoing 
passage.  Just as prosperity is the telos of exercising one‟s craft well, so dike with its 
socio/cosmic order is the result of well-performed deliberation concerning the rights 
of others.   
Furthermore, according to Gagarin, the oath “appears to have played an important 
part and was probably sworn by both the judge and the litigants,” although Gagarin 
acknowledges that “our evidence on this point is avowedly meager.”211  The 
swearing of oaths would appear to invite the gods to participate in the litigious 
process; however, this does not appear to have deterred corruption.
212
   
Here Gagarin acknowledges that force is a means to end a dispute; however, for the 
most part, this paragraph contains peaceful alternatives for the contenders to arrive at 
a resolution.  They could only do this if they turned their mind to the virtue of justice 
(dike).  It must also be borne in mind that Hesiod would have been aware of this 
procedure and counseled people to avoid it wherever they could, probably because he 
did not have a lot of faith in the level of appreciation of the virtue of justice in the 
members of his community.  It is for that reason he wrote the Works and Days and 
hoped people would apply the precepts he offered in it.   Hesiod‟s hope was that by 
following the advice in the Works and Days people would develop the virtue of 
justice to such an extent that they could do without turning their disputes over to 
somebody else.   
Hesiod was well aware that no one could be compelled to submit to dike, and, in fact, 
went to great lengths to point out that if one lived a just life one would appreciate the 
imprudence and hazards of embarking upon litigation.
213
  Again, this trades upon the 
virtue of justice, which a prudent man develops within himself, and its relation to 
institutional justice.  He may decide that he is better off trying to settle with his 
adversary rather than relying on the vagaries of a disinterested third party, the judge 
presiding over his dispute and deciding his future.  This was especially so in 
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Hesiod‟s times when aristocratic judges, susceptible to accepting bribes, represented 
the only judicial recourse that people in the agrarian community had.
214
   
Cornford on Dike and the Tao 
Cornford carries his examination of the meaning of dike further than Gagarin.  He 
reminds us that dike means “way”.215  Cornford has fully appreciated the Hesiodic 
message.  The “way” permeates all aspects of people‟s lives in the agora and at 
home.  Cornford suggests that dike is very close to the Chinese tao.
216
  For the 
Chinese, tao represents the order of the world, which consists of all that is correct 
and right in the universe: it never deviates from its course.  It consequently includes 
all correct and righteous dealings of men and spirits, which alone promote material 
happiness in life, no matter whether they are taking place between members of, and 
in, a community, or in the individual.
217
   
The tao includes the daily and yearly rotation and revolution of the earth and the two 
powers of light and darkness, as will be seen in the symbol for tai chi, which 
represent other opposites such as day and night, summer, winter, heat and cold, all of 
which terms are good in themselves because they are all impersonal parts of the 
universe working towards the one integrated whole.  Cornford tells us that: 
 T’ai-sui is the great year, the planet Jupiter, whose path in the heavens governs the 
 arrangements of the almanac act which is annually published by imperial authority, and 
 gives the various days suitable for the transactions of the various businesses of life. This God 
 thus rules the tao, or revolution of the universe, and, as a consequence, the tao of 




Cornford also points to the correspondence between Hesiod‟s ordered course of a 
man‟s ways and the seasons called Dike, Eunomia and Eirene.219  It is interesting that 
the Chinese almanac seems to be undergirded by the same convictions of the 
unfailing bountifulness of the universe as is Hesiod.  People are part of the tao 
because they belongs to the universe.  Any acts which oppose the tao are incorrect, 
abnormal and unnatural.
220
 Just as we are able to judge the functioning of our kitchen 
knife by the comfort and efficiency of use it affords, so according to the tao and 
Hesiod the efficiency of people can be judged by their cooperation with the universe 
of which they are a part.  
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According to Jaeger, Hesiod had a similar understanding of dike and urged people to 
follow the recipe for life that emerges throughout the Works and Days so that they 
would see the value of imitating cosmic order and continually refining the virtue of 
justice in themselves.
221
   
Hesiod believed that the injustice of the aristocratic nobles is already present in their 
life, like briar seeds in an otherwise well-manicured garden.  He hints at karma 
222
 in 
the following passage, commenting upon the harm to come to “the crooked man” 
who dragged justice (dike) out of the way”.   
 For pride is evil in a common man. 
 Even a noble finds it hard to bear; 
 It weights him down and leads him to disgrace. 
 ... the simpleton must learn 
 This fact through suffering.  The god of Oaths 
 Runs faster than a crooked verdict; when 
 Justice is dragged out of the way by men 
 Who judge dishonestly and swallow bribes, 
 A struggling sound is heard; then she returns 
 Back to the city and the homes of men, 
 Wrapped in a mist and weeping, and she brings 
 Harm to the crooked men who drove her out .
223 
This passage shows the cosmic harmony envisaged by Hesiod.  Here Hesiod is 
describing how the presence of Zeus‟ daughter, Dike, pervades the affairs of men and 
he stresses the necessity for her permanent presence in them, in their participation in 
the cosmic order.  In this passage, Hesiod points out that the affairs of people may 
still function without due regard to dike, but only in an anarchical way where nobody 
benefits on a lasting basis.     
Those “crooked men” who have no regard for dike, and who drive dike out, suffer 
their fate immediately.  It is already present in the social corruption that they have 
brought about, but more intensely in them, for they are functioning less than 
excellently.     
The Hesiodic terms of worth are not simply reserved for the successful, but include 
those who have set themselves on the path to becoming successful.  This is true for 
two reasons: firstly, because one cannot in advance place limitations on human 
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potential; and secondly, because any relaxation of the observance of Hesiod‟s 
directives for human flourishing would result in arete being lost.  Thus, these terms 
of worth will only apply to people provided they persevere in their quest to become 
panaristos.  The same persistence is required of the beginner as of the man who has 
acquired “fame and renown”.  This persistence was to stand the agrarian class in 
good stead in the Solonic reforms that afforded them opportunities to improve their 
lifestyle.   
In this discussion on Hesiod I have developed terms of behavioural value and themes 
used by him to urge his agrarian neighbours to follow the Greek ideal.  I have shown 
that Hesiod conceived dike as a cosmic all-pervading entity that would enter 
communal life, if invited, by well-executed work and considerate social and familial 
living.  For Hesiod the ideal person was the panaristos who thinks out everything for 
himself.  The panaristos, like the Greek ideal, serves us as a standard to strive after.  
It is in the journey that people find the fulfilment Hesiod believes will enmesh the 
ideal of kalos kagathos in their lives.  Although no one is capable of achieving this 
pinnacle of perfection, the panaristos is clearly Hesiod‟s idea of the human 














Solon’s Political Contribution to the Marriage of the Beautiful and the Good. 
In this chapter I examine Solon‟s contribution to the balancing of economic and 
social opportunities in the Greece of his times.  Vellacott says that Solon‟s task 
(B.C.E. 630–B.C.E. 560) was to reform the legislature to ensure greater opportunities 
for the oppressed lower classes.
224
  I shall attempt to show that Solon‟s reforms were 
an attempt to fulfil the ideal of the marriage of the beautiful and the good in 
achieving free interaction between all classes.  Whilst Hesiod had focussed on the 
development of the co-operative virtues,
225
 Solon, who was as earnest a moralist as 
Hesiod,
226
 sought to entrench them in the whole of Athenian society by way of 
legislative change.  This embraced reform and reconstruction of the heliaea (people‟s 
court)
227
 by extending membership of it to all free men, the breaking of the absolute 
political monopoly of the nobles,
228
 and paving the way for others to improve upon 
his work by building legislative discretion into the system.
229
  
Solon’s Concept of Justice 
According to Vlastos, Solon saw that “justice has a natural, self regulative order” and 
that he “thinks of justice as a divine power.”230  Solon‟s paradigm of justice is the sea 
which he says is  “justest when, being itself undisturbed by the winds, it does not 
disturb anyone or anything.”231  I suggest that Solon is not referring to the winds of 
change, which are inevitable, but rather to the forces of dissension unleashed by 
those justly dissatisfied with their lot.  The “self regulative order” can only operate if 
the cause of dissension is removed, which is what Solon aimed at achieving with his 
reforms.  This looks forward to Aristotle‟s constitutions of the “middle type” which 
is the superior form of government because in its flexibility it is free to fluctuate 
between behavioural extremes.   
Solon hinted at people receiving divine assistance in their deliberations, replicating 
as nearly as possible the divine patterns of justice and natural order.  Again, this 
appears to anticipate Aristotle‟s recipe of flexible behaviour which is brought about 
by the application of phronesis.
232
  Solon‟s reforms were a well thought out 
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endeavour to ensure observance of the “divine power” in the affairs of men in their 
dealings with each other outside areas of government, and were intended to enmesh 
the beauty of cosmic orderliness in human interaction.  Apparently, Solon grasped 
the idea that the virtue of justice needed to be mastered individually before it could 
be successfully introduced into the instrumentalities of government.   
Furthermore, there is a parallel between the Solonic reforms and the Hesiodic 
exhortations to perform well-executed work. The similarity consists in the 
opportunity for creative and constructive individual activity in a world where 
opportunities were to be more justly and evenly distributed.  Just as Hesiod had seen 
work in his agrarian community as a way to replicate cosmic excellence, Solon used 
the mechanism of laws that preserved personal dignity and distributed opportunity 
for advancement to everybody.   
There is an analogy here between the objects like the kitchen knife and the samurai 
sword.  Solon needed to use imagination to picture how people‟s situation could be 
ameliorated.  Thus he had to invent his own “kitchen knife” and put it into its proper 
setting.  This was a far more challenging task than simply having to evaluate the 
beauty of an object when one is apprised of its function.  In introducing means to 
achieve political equilibrium, Solon was able to bring a certain harmony to human 
government.  A political system creates its own ambience. In looking upon such a 
system one does not need to ask what purpose it serves.  Its appropriateness for the 
task is self evident to the informed onlooker.   
At the beginning of the Sixth Century there was deep and widespread dissatisfaction 
among the Athenian lower classes.
233
 The imbalance in Athenian society caused by 
the landowners exploiting the agrarian classes, and the privation of those who had  
bonded themselves personally to secure debt, had caused a discord that was the 
antithesis of a society functioning excellently and harmoniously.  Solon warned: 
Dysnomia (the opposite of eunomia) [good order]
234
 causes many kaka (disasters to the 
 city), whereas eunomia makes all things orderly and appropriate, and often puts fetters on the 
 adikoi (unjust); while eunomia makes the rough smooth, checks success, brings hubris to 
 obscurity and withers the blossoming flowers of ate (destruction).
235
 
 According to Humphreys, “the straightness” of Solon‟s laws is given a new definition not 
 found in the earlier sources: it is by being shaped alike for the  base and for the prestigious 
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 (kakos and agathos) that his thesmoi
236
 will provide a straight judgment in every case.  
 Hesiod had earlier said that the good king will give straight judgments both to locals and to 
 strangers.
237
   
The “straightness” of Solon‟s laws and the “straight judgments” mentioned by 
Hesiod also anticipate Aristotle‟s phronesis directing behavioural excellence in 
institutionalized justice.
238
  The aesthetic nature of “straightness” in the way that 
these two authors apply the concept is anything but the rigidity implied in the word 
“straight” which suggests a picture of an unswerving line delineating the distance 
between two geometrical points, or, perhaps, uncompromising behaviour.  Judgments 
that achieve justice, regardless of the issues at stake and the class of the litigants 
involved, are beautiful because of their flexibility which fits all disputes. 
Furthermore, such judgments are aesthetically pleasing because they break down the 
barriers of prejudice and class distinction which will result in a more egalitarian 
society.  They are a judicial example of people pursuing the ideal of kalos kagathos. 
Again Solon says:  
 These things I did by the exercise of my power, blending together force and justice, and I 
 persevered to the end as I promised.
239
 
Solon also grasped the need to record and promulgate the law so its content would be 
available to everybody.  Humphreys tells us that “this was the reason for writing laws 
down: not so much a question of information, but as of fixity.  Writing objectified the 
law, and ensured that it would remain the same in every case.”240   
Solon was endeavouring to emulate the gods who did not die, but rather lived an 
unchanging life.
241
  Solon knew that the highest human good he could offer his 
community was a well-balanced legal system in which the rules were adequately 
promulgated, and his attempts at judicial fairness are apparent.  This judicial model 
attempts to replicate cosmic order in communal human affairs.  In endeavouring to 
emulate the unchanging excellence of the lives of the divinity it must have been 
evident to Solon that the only aspect in which this could be achieved in the affairs of 
humankind was the realization that people must be ever vigilant to adapt the rules 
governing society to changing necessity.  The ideal of kalos kagathos is reflected in 
positive change.   
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The Athenians turned to Solon because he lived an orderly life, which they thought 
equipped him with the vision necessary to rekindle a degree of order in a society 
driven by pleonexia/hubris on the part of the nobles and resentful submission by the 
members of the rural community.
242
  Of himself Solon said: 
 I long to have money, but am unwilling to possess it unjustly, for retribution assuredly comes 
 afterwards. Wealth which the gods give remains with a man, secure from the lowest 
 foundation to the top, whereas wealth which men honour with violence comes in disorder, 




Solon wished to remove economic injustice  “without radically affecting the structure 
of society: agathoi and kakoi should remain in their appointed place.”244  His mission 
was to afford everyone the opportunity to develop to the full extent of his/her 
capacity.  In order to deal with the problem of the landless peasants, Solon 
encouraged everybody to learn a trade or a craft.  Solon‟s aim was to increase the 
importance of the individual and to enhance his bargaining power in the marketplace.  
Developed personal attributes would render him less susceptible to exploitation.  
Again, showing how the masses should be treated, Solon said: 
And in this way the masses should best follow their leaders, if they are given neither too 
 much freedom nor subjected to too much restraint.  For excess breeds insolence, whenever 
 great prosperity comes to men who are not of sound mind.
245
 
However, Solon could not please everyone.  The peasants thought that Solon‟s 
reforms did not go far enough and, in this, they did not understand the profundity of 
Solon‟s project.  They thought that a redistribution of land ownership was the answer 
to their problems.  They appear to have been interested only in the “quick fix” with 
no regard to the overall effect land redistribution would have on the whole of society.  
Solon did not want to redistribute ownership of the land, although he was pressured 
to do so according to Rosivach,
246
 because that would have meant destroying the 
aristocratic class,
247
 who were the only ones who knew how to manage tracts of land 
on a grand scale.  The kitchen knife would only continue to operate effectively in 
experienced hands. 
Solon was convinced that dike is an inseparable part of the divine world order.
248
  
For Solon every transgression of justice constituted an imbalance in the cosmic 
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order.  In Solon‟s eyes Eunomia was a goddess like Dike.  Eunomia manifests itself 
in the peace and harmony of the whole social cosmos.
249
  Here Solon shows that he 
grasps the importance of the virtue of justice which must be present in all individuals 
and communities if they are to function excellently.  According to Vlastos, “the 
precious right of “straightening crooked judgments” now ceases to be the exclusive 
privilege of public officials” and is now  “everybody‟s business.”250 
Some Conclusions 
Whilst Solon does not appear to have envisaged a democracy, he certainly paved the 
way for it.
251
  Solon appears to have been aware that only people who had developed 
the virtue of justice within themselves, with its concomitant dignity, could contribute 
breadth of vision to human affairs.
252
  His reforms went a long way toward the 
instilling of personal dignity in those that had hitherto been deprived of it.  The 
Solonic reforms abolished as many incidents of oppression as possible without 
upsetting the fundamental balance of society.  By sweeping away the occasions of 
exploitation of the economically oppressed, Solon created the opportunity for them 
to initiate their own order in society.  Providing people with the opportunity to forge 
their own excellent functioning community is to introduce them to the ideal of kalos 
kagathos.  Solon thought that justice could only exist in a community where 
individuals were free to exercise choice in their private and communal lives.     
Solon‟s contribution to the marriage of the beautiful and the good was to create a 
more level playing field for people to develop their talents than he had found when 
entering upon his archonship.  Solon made the connection between personal freedom 
and human dignity.  He saw that human dignity would be reflected in the orderly 
(cosmic) behaviour of the individual systematically going about tasks in the 
community that would benefit it, not only at the regulatory level, but in all facets of 
society.   
The Solonic reforms attempt to replicate the patterns of nature and the divinity where 
all people are free to attain their full potential.  Solon made this possible by ensuring 
personal freedom and freeing people from the need to expend time avoiding 
exploitation by others.  This approach had been adopted by Hesiod who urged people 
to spend their time in performing work well, rather than engage in risky and costly 
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litigation which fostered the development of a mind-set that prevented people from 
imitating cosmic order in their lives.  
Solon realized that order in people‟s private and social lives must be won for 
themselves.  Solon appears to have been looking forward to Aristotle, when, as 
Weinberg reminds us, he held:  
Each thing, so far as possible, attempts to become as much like the First Cause (or Prime 
 Mover) as its nature permits. Animate beings must act and reproduce and achieve an 
 immortality (an eternity) for their own kind, and all the other things in nature in characteristic 
 ways imitate the Divine Life.
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If the basis of society were to change, it was going to have to be as a result of orderly 
interaction between its constituent classes.  Solon went no further than to relieve 
injustice and to impose restraints upon the monopoly of power by one class.  He 
says: 
 And those who suffered shameful slavery right here, trembling before the whims of their 
 masters, I set free.  These things I did by the exercise of my power, blending together force 
 and justice, and I persevered to the end as I promised.  I wrote laws for the lower and upper 
 classes alike, providing a straight legal process for each person.
254
   
In this chapter I have endeavoured to show how Solon recognised the right to equal 
opportunity in the citizens he ruled over.  To achieve this, Solon created 
opportunities for personal/vocational development for everyone.  Solon believed that 
the ideal of kalos kagathos, like justice, was an overarching community principle.  
To this end he made sure that the community was not weakened by reforms that 
would create control in the hands of those who lacked expertise to exercise it.  For 
example, he left the control of large viable tracts of land with the nobles who knew 
how to farm them.  Solon knew that the Greek ideal could only flourish in a 








In this chapter I shall show how Plato developed paradigms to improve people‟s 
ability to use their faculty of reason.  Apparently Plato believed that improved 
intelligence would enable people to attain the ideal of kalos kagathos.  In Chapter 5 
of the Republic, Socrates describes the form of the good in the simile of the cave, 
drawing a parallel between the visible and the intelligible worlds.
255
  For Plato, the 
visible world contains particulars which are objects of sight, whilst the intelligible 
world is populated by forms (ideae or eidoi), which are accessible only to the 
intellect and are not knowable, save by way of abstraction, from the particulars 
available to us.
256
  These forms are perfect patterns of the changing particulars of our 
world of appearances and reflect the Greek ideal. 
The sun enjoys primacy of position in the visible world whilst the good occupies a 
corresponding one in the intelligible world.  The sun‟s light, which is not sight, but 
which facilitates it, carries impressions of the visible world to the eye.  Light is not 
only the vehicle of perception, but also the cause of all growth in the sensible world.  
It is part of the universal good present in all things, while remaining separate from 
them.  The faculty of sight is the initial move towards the realisation of people‟s true 
nature, a reflexive action which responds involuntarily to light.  This level of 
perception provides only an incomplete understanding of the nature of things in the 
sensible realm.  Plato wanted to encourage people to realise the fullness of their 
human potential by meditating on the forms of the suprasensible world.
257
 
Relationship between Plato’s Notion of Perception and Aesthetics 
Plato‟s doctrines of perception and aesthetics are very closely linked.  Intellectual 
perception involves the mastery of suprasensible concepts growing out of the 
perception of the mundane world.  This higher level of perception is not available to 
everybody, either because of a lack of intellect, or perhaps inclination.  Everyone 
with the faculty of sight is able to understand something of the sensible world.  It is 
composed of a hierarchy of existence dependant upon the life-giving source we 
receive from the sun.  The gradually developing awareness of the way in which the 
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world functions, and the realisation that without the sun it would not be able to 
function, is the path to our understanding the world‟s beauty.   
This awareness that everything is dependent upon the sun may blossom into an 
appreciation of how everything in the world is inter-dependant for its existence on 
other things.  The world and all the living things that it contains are a gigantic food 
chain with one creature preying on another.  Apparently ugly creatures like 
crocodiles and reptiles reveal their special beauty in their adaptability for the niche 
they inhabit.  Plato tells us that this faculty of knowledge is the beginning of 
understanding the intelligible world.
258
  He equates the good, which he sees as an 
overarching form, with the sun, and the faculty of sight with the faculty of 
knowledge.  Once the faculty of knowledge has been awakened in the inquirer, 
he/she will seek to ask questions, which, according to Plato, will lead him/her to an 
appreciation of the forms.   
The tyro‟s introduction to the forms is the ability of the human brain to absorb and 
collate facts into a workable body of knowledge comprised of earthly particulars.  
This process requires a sifting and organising of empirical data, which is discerned in 
the sensible world through the human senses of perception of sight, hearing, tactility, 
smell and taste.  The data so collected does not constitute a useful body of 
knowledge about the object under scrutiny until the intellect decides what is sought 
to be known about the object in question.  For example, the botanist may wish to 
know how each part of the plant enables it to survive and flourish as a whole, 
whereas the poet may see it as a representation of beauty or revelation.  The 
philosopher ought to ask why it is there.  
The Role of the Good in the Suprasensible and Sensible World 
The foregoing process appears to bring intelligibility to “objects of thought” and the 
power of knowing to the mind.  According to Plato, for Socrates the source of this 
intelligibility of the “objects of knowledge” and of their being was the good,  “yet the 
good was not itself that reality, but, rather, beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and 
power”.259 Socrates demonstrated his conviction by drawing an analogy from the sun 
and its relationship with the eye‟s power of sight.  He said, “Moreover, though the 
sun is not itself sight, it is the cause of sight, and is seen by the sight it causes”.260  
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The quest of the Platonic dialogues was the true meaning of any expression he chose 
to examine, such as fineness.
261
 Socrates thought that excellence in human 
behaviour, which he describes as justice, was the telos of the good life.  This could 
only be achieved by the search for precise knowledge in whatever investigation 
people were undertaking at the time.  Plato further elaborated the simile of the sun by 
the analogy of the Divided Line, the purpose of which was to demonstrate that we 
can know but little of objects in the sensible world if our knowledge does not extend 
beyond their appearance.
262
   
Dialectic – A Means to Understanding the Good 
There is a correlation between the sensible and the supersensible realms with noesis, 
or dialectic, representing the utmost pure form of knowledge in the supersensible 
realm.
263
  I shall demonstrate how an appreciation of the beautiful in the sensible 
world is the only way that people may aspire to the good.  The journey of the 
intellect is thus to locate the good in each object of the sensible world.  According to 
Plato, only then will the world, and all that is in it, be fully understood.  A marriage 
of the beautiful and the good must take place in the human intellect for people to 
attain their potential of kalos kagathos. 
Dialectic, or Noesis, like the sun, is the medium to increased understanding of the 
world and the celestial realm where the forms dwell.  The dialectic is the ultimate, 
the summa bonum, a full understanding of which will always be out of reach of the 
human intellect, but which, nevertheless, draws us to it in an ever increasing 
intellectual/emotional development.  By engaging in noesis people generate human 
goods because they are striving to continually refine their intellect.  Dialectic 
pervades the whole gamut of human existence.  It is present at each level of the 
hierarchy of human goods.  It must be taught to those who have not been called to 
examine it by themselves by philosophers who have.  This appears in the Socratic 
dialogues where Socrates often alludes to the various worldly callings, such as 
carpentry and ship building, in his bid to ascertain precision in the use of various 
words.
264
  This quest, like all ideals, involves searching for meanings beyond those 
commonly accepted in the sensible world. 
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In the simile of the cave, Plato lays further emphasis on the distinction between 
knowledge of objects in the visible world and the consequent illusion with which it 
limits the mind.  The escaped prisoner going from the shadows on the wall to being 
bathed in the sun‟s rays is a didactic metaphor for our own epistemological journey.  
This simile further points up the role of the good in the visible world as the 
overarching cause of all existing things.  It also provides the medium for people to 
appreciate the true nature of things because it exists also in people in the form of an 
intellectual impetus to fulfil their own true natures.  The recognition of the good 
comes by degrees and it is a development of the appreciation of the beautiful.
265
 
Beauty is the terrestrial vehicle that takes us to the good.  It will take, however, 
meditation on the inner essence of the things of the sensible world before people will 
see their connection with the ultimate source of the good.  In this metaphor the good 
is the sun, which is not only the source of light, but also the cause of our ability to 
perceive the created order.   
All things on earth need the sun‟s light and warmth to exist.  For example, plants 
have the ability to synthesise organic compounds from carbon dioxide and water 
using light energy absorbed by chlorophyll.  There is a corresponding process in 
certain bacteria.  Vitamin A is absorbed into animate bodies through the sun‟s rays.  
This process shows that the sun is the source of all life, which is the good.  Beauty 
consists in the clarity and consonance of the orderly hierarchical structure of these 
life forms.  It is an understanding of how living things work that leads us to 
appreciate their beauty, which brings us to the source of their existence, the light 
from the sun which Plato appears to equate with “The good, reality and source of 
truth”.266  The image of the ideal kitchen knife will then be in full view. 
The good, then, is an overweening principle that exists independently of the created 
order and beyond it.  It would seem to follow that Plato
267
 is obliged to admit that we 
will never know the true nature of things. This looks forward to Kant‟s philosophy 
which says, “We can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into 
them”.268  However, in accordance with our pursuit of the Greek ideal we must 
continue to evolve towards the fulfilment of our true nature which is to seek precise 
knowledge.  This appears to be Plato‟s position also.  I argue this from the 
methodology Socrates uses in his interrogative quest for the meaning of virtue and 
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the precise meaning of words in the Socratic dialogues.  Frederick Copleston points 
out that in most of the dialogues the quest yields no result.
269
   The only success story 
is in the Protagoras in which the conclusion reached was that virtue could be 
taught.
270
  The lesson to be learnt is that Socrates never gives up his search.  He is 
faithful to it even unto death.
271
   
It can be seen that Plato recognises the good in the created order and its hierarchical 
nature in the material world by comparing it to the sun.  Both the sun and the good 
share common attributes.  They are the centre and the source of the created order and 
for all practical purposes the sun, like the good, is inextinguishable.   
In Plato‟s philosophy there are gradients of beauty all of which participate in a 
supreme or universal beauty, which is the source of all earthly beauty.  For example, 
we see beauty in our kitchen knife, with its ideally shaped handle which comfortably 
fits the hand, and excellent cutting blade.  But this is a different beauty from that of a 
person whose classical features display the physical particulars of integrity, 
proportion and clarity and encourage us to further investigate as to whether he/she 
possesses the softer charms and quiet virtues which may define him/her as an 
accomplished and morally developed person.   
Kalos Kagathos Personalised 
The morally developed person is described as the „truly good‟ man by Tredennick 
and Waterfield who have synthesized the following list of qualities that the kalos 
kagathos embodies from various passages throughout the Memoirs of Xenophon:  
1. freedom (as opposed to slavishness) as a result of self-discipline; 
2. certain knowledge and a certain degree of education;  
3. the ability to make good friends and get on with people; 
4. the ability to do good things to friends (and harm to enemies); 
5. the ability to manage one‟s estate and, if need be, one‟s country; 
6. the ability to do good to one‟s country; and 
7. the traditional virtues, such as wisdom, justice, self control and piety.
272
   
In Socrates‟ case, there is an eighth item: the ability to teach and make others truly 
good.
273
  Socrates possessed this latter quality because he put the search for human 
 66 
goods above even life itself.  In the face of his judges he maintained his belief in his 
mission to educate those who would listen to him.  He said: 
The truth of the matter is this, gentleman.  Where a man has taken up his stand, either 
 because it seems best to him or in obedience to his orders, there I believe he is bound to 
 remain and face the danger, taking no account of death or anything else before 
 dishonour.
274    
Tredennick and Waterfield point out that, “Xenophon did not invent the phrase 
(though the abstract noun kalokagathia, „true goodness‟, first occurs in his 
Works).”275  
In this chapter, I have argued that Plato invited people to meditate upon the Greek 
ideal by fixing their attention on the suprasensible forms.  The mental journey that 
Plato bids us to undertake is similar to the Socratic quest for precise meaning.  We 
may never arrive at the goal, but diligent involvement in the journey is reward 
enough.  Continued application to personal improvement is participation in the Greek 
ideal which will take a lifetime to perfect.  Full knowledge of the forms is no more 














Plato‟s philosophy was built around a distinction between the suprasensible and 
sensible worlds; the latter could only be fully understood with a knowledge of the 
former.  Aristotle‟s approach was somewhat different.  He did not believe in 
extramundane models.  Aristotle‟s philosophy was grounded in anthropocentric 
considerations.  For him human goods were to be found in the practical deliberation 
on matters that were available to human senses.  The perfect kitchen knife was not an 
extraterrestrial entity; it was to come into view in our world of experience.   
Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not base his moral philosophy on a suprasensible plane.  
In his translation of the Poetics, Malcolm Heath centres Aristotle‟s philosophical 
system in “The pleasure we take in looking at things and assimilating information 
through our senses”.276 I shall only be covering Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics and 
his Poetics in this thesis.  Both works are concerned with human behaviour, and the 
possibility of achieving a degree of excellence in it.  It is in applying themselves to 
achieving these behavioural excellences that people will make a progressive 
contribution to human goods through their improved behaviour.  Aristotle combines 
guides for good behaviour where he advocates appropriate control of emotion with 
exposure to emotional excess as a cure for inability to control emotion.  This twofold 
approach to behavioural equilibrium is aimed at the individual achieving the ideal of 
kalos kagathos within himself.   
Nussbaum puts the Aristotelian position very nicely when she sets out to consider … 
“who the person of practical wisdom is and how he deliberates, how the Platonic 
aspiration to universality, precision, and stable control is met and criticised in 
Aristotle‟s more yielding and flexible conception of responsive perception.”277  
Aristotle uses the term “phronesis” which involves flexibility and freedom of choice 
in making decisions.  Nussbaum goes on to say that “Aristotle claims that practical 
deliberation must be anthropocentric, concerning itself with the human good rather 
than with the good simpliciter.” 278  Practical deliberation can be practised either in 
community, or individually.  Firstly, I shall discuss Aristotle‟s conviction that 
politics is the most esteemed human study.    
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Communal Concerns 
In Book 1 of the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle held that the “absolute good” in 
human behaviour is to be found in the government.
279
  The highest human good is 
the study of politics because it controls “what subjects are to be taught in states, 
which of these the different sections of the population are to learn, and up to what 
point.”280  “It consists in knowing how to organise the community for the best.”281  
According to Joad, Aristotle insists that the specific good of a state “is to be sought 
in something beyond a state; namely, in that of the individuals who comprise the 
state.”282   
Aristotle begins with people‟s place in society at the beginning of the Nichomachean 
Ethics because most people have enough natural ability to belong to and to contribute 
to a community and thus contribute to the good of all people.
283
  He regarded people 
as political animals by nature.  Aristotle then argues that the absolute good for man is 
directed at the improvement of the community, which for him would seem to mean 
that selfishness is the antithesis of the good.  Further support for this conclusion by 
Aristotle is his claim that morally correct acts consist in that which receives 
approbation of the community.
284
   
An important theme in the Nichomachean Ethics is the method by which we attain 
the human good by developing proficiency in the study of politics and in other areas 
of human endeavour.  Aristotle announces his approach in the closing sentence of 
Chapter 2 of book 1 of the Nichomachean Ethics when he says: 
 But what is good for a nation or a city has a higher, a diviner quality.  Such being the matters 
 we seek to investigate, the investigation may fairly be represented as the study of politics.
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In placing “the absolutely good” in the deliberative sector of the community, 
Aristotle recognises an overriding good that the community is obliged to seek and 
pursue, which would appear to be some action which acts upon the community, but 
only while people are deliberating in community.
286
  This may consist in finding 
newer and more efficient ways to alleviate poverty and ignorance and so on.   
These activities apply to benefiting the general standard of living in the community 
and protecting its members in the face of adversity.  The appropriate forum for such 
deliberation in Aristotle‟s times was the agora where all free male citizens could 
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contribute to discussion about correcting society‟s ills and finding better ways to 
progress activities within it.  This is a further example of the coming together of the 
beautiful and the good.  It involves a quest for human good in community, the extent 
of which cannot be completely plotted at the time of the deliberation.  It is the quest 
for the kalos kagathos. 
Scholars disagree whether Aristotle says that we do not deliberate about ends, but 
rather about the means to get there.
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  I suggest we deliberate about ends.  An 
example may be the desire to achieve a certain level of prosperity within a fixed 
period of time.  The sum decided upon is the result of some deliberation after we 
consider why we need it, and how much will fulfil that need.  Pondering effective 
means to achieve the financial goal will then follow.  The human good here is 
moderation in the time we spend acquiring worldly wealth and achieving a balance in 
our overall use of time. 
The Breathalyser and the Artificial Lake 
When deliberating upon a question concerning the community, the aim is either to 
decide upon the course of action to remedy a social ill or something which has 
outlived its usefulness.  An example may be amending the Road Traffic Act to detect 
drunken drivers, such as the regulation and continued improvement of breathalyser 
equipment. Driving with an excess of alcohol in the bloodstream distorts judgement 
and thus puts other members of the community at risk.  It is ugly behaviour which 
stands out against the background of law and order. 
The deliberation may be of an open ended nature, such as how the construction of an 
artificial lake for irrigation purposes may impact upon environmental issues.  In this 
latter example, the goal is not known.  It will depend upon the evidence collected and 
whether it discloses any other issues to be resolved.  Both of these examples 
acknowledge the existence of the good.  In the former, the parameters of the social 
goal are already identified and the task is to implement it in a workable way in the 
legal procedure.   
The idea of detecting breath alcohol would have taken shape in some sector of the 
community and then been given to a scientist to perfect.  The notion constitutes a 
human good, or aim.  It is only the scientist that is able to realise the aim in its 
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complete form, because only he or she understands the necessary principles to build 
the machine.  The scientist‟s faithful adherence to these principles in achieving the 
task exhibit beauty in persistence in a quest to further human goods.   
Once this has been achieved, the breathalyser has to fit into enforceable laws.  The 
parliamentary draftsman achieves his end by having regard to legal principles, 
making sure that his legislation does not exceed the power given to him by the 
parliament.  He needs to observe the beauty of the English language by choosing 
precise words to achieve his aim.  The goods generated by effective drunken driving 
laws are as self evident as the well-crafted kitchen knife. 
The committee considering the question of the lake is dealing with open-ended 
issues.  Here a balance between a known aspect of the question, i.e. how much water 
the artificial lake will deliver to a region deficient in water, is capable of calculation, 
but the impact of creating the lake has yet to be determined.    Such questions as the 
presence of rare flora and fauna and the need to preserve them in the region are the 
obvious ones.  The difference between this inquiry and the breathalyser is that side 
issues may emerge, such as the life cycle of an unknown plant or animal.  In our first 
example the good is identified and in this one it is being sought after.   
These undertakings involve speculative thinking, not only about those aspects of 
human life that I have discussed, but also as to how they will impact upon individual 
freedom.  We need to have regard for the ethical considerations of how far the state 
ought to interfere with people‟s right to educate themselves and enjoy their leisure.  
However, John Locke‟s minimalist approach of government interference in citizen‟s 
affairs needs to be continually reviewed in the light of increased technology.
288
  In 
his times there were no cars to become lethal weapons in the hands of drunken 
drivers.  These examples are fairly illustrative of how human goods are generated 
pursuant to Aristotelian principles in communal issues.  I will now briefly consider 
Aristotle‟s thoughts on the development of the individual. 
The community can only operate effectively if it is made up of well-balanced people.  
Aristotle‟s thoughts as to how individuals may aspire to that level of functioning are 
tied to his conception of “happiness”, which is achieved in self sufficiency.289  For 
Aristotle self-sufficiency is the telos of human life: 
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 It is a generally accepted view that the final good is self-sufficient.  By „self-sufficient‟ is 
 meant not what is sufficient for ones self living the life of a solitary but includes           
 parents, wife and children, friends and fellow-citizens in general.  For man is a social animal.  
 A self-sufficient thing then, we take to be one which on its own footing tends to make life 
 desirable and lacking in nothing.  And we regard happiness as such a thing.
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Aristotle further qualifies happiness when he says: 
 There is another condition of happiness; it cannot be achieved in less than a complete 
 lifetime.  One swallow does not make a summer, neither does one fine day.  And one day, or 
 indeed any brief period of felicity, does not make a man entirely and perfectly happy. 
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The foregoing passages sum up Aristotle‟s concept of “human good”.  It is important 
to notice that Aristotle does not define happiness.  He leaves that to be discovered by 
each individual when they are fully rational, which means “to function well as a 
human being.”292  Aristotle advocates a balanced life in all things.   
Aristotle on the Kitchen Knife 
Aristotle tells us that the best life is the one lived in harmony with one‟s fellows.293  
Nussbaum explains that this entails the application of phronesis in our lives.  
Nussbaum reminds us, “how the Platonic aspiration to universality, precision, and 
stable control is met and criticised in Aristotle‟s more „yielding‟ and flexible 
conception of responsive perception.”294  This distinction clarifies the fluid nature of 
Aristotle‟s recipe for the good life.  Aristotle sees beauty in behavioural adaptability.  
This appears to involve a mastery of all the human virtues with phronesis acting as 
an over-arching governor in all cases.  Thus, the middle way is a dynamic 
involvement in life acting in an appropriate manner on all occasions.  This is the 
continual thought going into improving the design of the kitchen knife. 
Aristotle‟s virtuous man resembles an adept golfer.  For the golfer, each club 
possesses a range of possibilities.  The player may grip down the shaft a little and 
punch the shot, producing a low trajectory or they may play a distance shot with a 
full swing.  There are an infinite number of variations in between these two 
possibilities. The seasoned player will need to take into account weather conditions, 
whether the green is dry or wet, the wind, and so on.  In the same way Aristotle‟s 
virtuous man needs to cultivate a similar flexibility in all virtues that go to make up 
excellence in human behaviour.  
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The Middle Way 
The theme of Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics is the pathway to human happiness in 
which he examines various virtues such as courage, modesty, temperance and justice, 
to name a few.  Aristotle examines these virtues by placing them at the mid-point 
between behavioural extremes.  For example, courage is the mean of timidity and 
recklessness.  Extreme points of conduct are brought about by an excess of emotion. 
A timid person takes fright easily and is unable to break out of his behavioural prison 
because he fears the consequences of the unknown.  Usually he will take no risks.  If 
he finds himself suddenly in danger he may be behaviourally paralysed.  On the other 
hand, the reckless person behaves with too much abandon, foregoing reason to act 
upon the spur of the moment.  He catapults himself into dangerous situations without 
considering the consequences.   
Choosing the middle path between these two extremes involves the employment of 
practical wisdom which will result in a toning down of emotional excess.
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Nussbaum reminds us that “practical wisdom uses rules only as summaries and 
guides and must be flexible, ready for surprise, prepared to be resourceful at 




These directives ought to enable the agent to decide upon appropriate action in all 
circumstances.  An example is to be found in a potential bar room brawl situation.  
The prudent individual exercising practical reason will withdraw from such a scene, 
provided withdrawal is possible.  He will only engage in physical violence if it is 
absolutely necessary to protect himself or somebody else for whom he is responsible.  
Aristotle advises that to err on the side of caution is the preferred course.  An 
analysis of the range of emotions and the commingling of them with the exercise of 
reason in this predicament will be revealing.  It is reasonable to suppose that a 
peaceful agent would feel apprehensive of being threatened or insulted.  It may even 
approach fear.  A prudent person would start thinking of a way to neutralise the 
situation immediately he saw it coming upon him.  He would realise that the 
disparagement that he may suffer at the hands of the onlookers would be of no 
account.  Far more important would be the possibility of suffering physical damage 
or being taken in charge for disorderly conduct.  He would realise that virtuous 
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behaviour depends upon his acting as a self-sufficient individual in a situation not of 
his making, rather than getting caught up in the madness of the moment.  The 
reckless agent would cast all care to one side, and, if he were of a pugilistic bent, 
engage in the brawl.  His reaction would abandon reason.  The timid person on the 
other hand would simply feel fear and would be unable to reason out the alternatives.  
He would be gripped with panic, which, too, involves an excess of emotion to the 
detriment of prudence.
298
  Aristotle uses the same approach to examine the other 
virtues.   
Balancing the Emotions 
In order to achieve behavioural equilibrium we must learn to exercise the faculty of 
reason.  This will depend upon the control we can exert over our emotions.  David 
Bostock tells us that in Aristotle “Each virtue is associated with a particular feeling 
or emotion …” and “The virtuous disposition is one which involves a harmony 
between emotion and reason: both pull in the same direction.” 299  Emotions are 
sometimes an appropriate reaction to a situation and may be an end in themselves, 
such as tears at the loss of a loved one.
300
  This behaviour is the release of grief 
which must be worked through so the agent can return to living a balanced life.  
Reason will only serve the mourner after the first and full impact of the loss has been 
softened by the passage of time.  Grief of this type is regarded as normal in our 
community and the support of family and friends usually aid the mourner to get over 
the loss.  A sort of cleansing takes place as the mourner is gradually able to integrate 
his/her memory of the loved one into its proper place, i.e. the past.  Reason dictates 
that life must go on without the loved one, and thus balance between emotion and 
reason is slowly restored.  The cleansing process has been brought about by the 
support of family/friends, the fading of the initial shock of the loss and the relegation 
of the memory to an appropriate place in the mental life of the mourner.   
Katharsis in Tragedy 
In The Tragedians Aristotle describes the healing (katharsis) process as the … 
“effecting through pity and fear the purification of such emotions”.301  Malcolm 
Heath tells us that Aristotle held that emotions were not irrational impulses.
302
  The 
emotions are grounded in our understanding which means they are an interpretation 
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of any given situation that may arise and thus are capable of ethical evaluation. 
303
  
Heath cites the following passage from the Nicomachean Ethics which demonstrates 
the close link between emotion and virtue: 
 For example, fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity and in general pleasure and distress can be 
 experienced in greater or lesser degree and in both cases wrongly.  To feel them at the right 
 time, in response to the right things, with regard to the right people, for the right reason and 
 in the right way – that is the mean and the optimum, which is the characteristic of virtue.304 
From the brief reference to the emotions in the Poetics it appears that Aristotle 
believes that by subjecting people prone to an excess of emotion to that excess in 
others, such as in actors on the stage, the tendency to emotional excess in ordinary 
life will be released.  Removal of such excess may restore the sufferer to a healthy 
balance which is pleasurable.
305
  Cottingham holds that, “The predominant 
Aristotelian conception of the good life involved the harmonious flourishing of all 
our human capacities, under the broad guidance of reason”.306  Lillie tells us that, 
“The mean is as a prudent man would determine it.  The ability of a prudent man is 
not the theoretical ability of the philosopher, but the practical ability of the man of 
experience.”307 
Subjecting people to an excess of what causes their imbalance received further 
attention in the Politics in which Aristotle observed that music which stimulated the 
frenzy of the followers of the cult of Dionysus could have a calming (kathartic) 
effect: 
The emotion which effects some minds violently exists in all, but in different degrees, e.g. 
pity and fear, and also enthusiasm; for some people are prone to this disturbance, and we can 
observe the effect of sacred music on such people: whenever they make use of songs which 
arouse the mind to frenzy, they are calmed and attain as it were healing and katharsis.  
Necessarily precisely the same effect applies to those prone to pity or fear or, in general, any 
other emotion, and to others to the extent that each is susceptible to such things: for all there 
occurs katharsis and pleasurable relief.
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Aristotle‟s views on how to redress an imbalance of emotion are more robustly 
presented than his view of how people can develop moral dispositions.  He presents 
these cures for uncontrolled emotions against the backdrop of an orderly literary 
device which William Barrett explains as: 
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 A drama … must have a beginning, middle, and end.  The action begins at a certain 
 point, rises towards a climax, and then falls to a denouement … his structure must be an 
 intelligible whole in which each part develops logically out of what went before.
309 
Thus Aristotle brings order out of behavioural chaos by the cleansing ingredients of 
pity and fear presented in a literary work which invites the audience to replicate its 
order in their own lives.   
Eudaimonia: The Marriage of the Beautiful and the Good 
A large number of the books of the Nichomachean Ethics are devoted to a 
consideration of various virtues such as courage, temperance, sobriety and so on, 
until we arrive in book 10 at a consideration of the „contemplative‟ life.  For 
Aristotle the contemplative life consists in study for its own sake.  Aristotle points 
out that the contemplative person will be happy only if he has mastered all of the 
other virtues and is able to enjoy the society of his fellow beings in friendship and 
the family.   
Such a person will have achieved an appreciation of Aristotle‟s notion of the “human 
good” and will have done so by functioning excellently, or flourishing in all aspects 
of his life.  His actions will reflect proportionate, or beautiful, behaviour and he will 
be on the way to achieving the status of kalos kagathos.  It is to be noted that the 
kalos never becomes the agathos during one‟s life for, according to Aristotle, a 
person can only be happy at the end of a well-lived life.  It seems to follow that a 
person could not be called kalos kagathos at any other time than after a life well-
lived.  This is because a person is not in a frozen setting like the knife in the kitchen, 
which although capable of improvement may be beautiful at any given time. 
Aristotle’s Theory of Causation 
Before leaving Aristotle I should like to set out his theory of causation which for him 
explains how things like the kitchen knife come into existence: 
Causes are spoken of in four ways, of which one cause we say to be the substance and the 
 essence (for the „why‟ is referred to the extreme term, and the cause and principle is the 
 primary „why‟), and the second is the matter and substrate, and the third is that from which 
 comes the beginning of the change, and the fourth is the opposite cause to this, the 
 „wherefore‟ and the good  (for this is the end of all coming into being and change)…310 
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It appears Aristotle means them to be understood as follows.     
(a)  The material cause is the material from which an object such as a bed is 
made. 
(b)  The formal cause is the shape into which the material enters.  It is possible 
that during manufacture the carpenter will improve the design.  Similarly, 
craftsmen may improve the design over long periods.  This will certainly 
alter the formal cause as it was originally imagined and may affect the 
quality of the final cause.  Like his teaching on ethics, the Aristotelian 
pattern of causes does not occur rigidly one after the other, but rather as a 
constant unpredictable and interactive interplay.   
 In designing the bed we need to think of the need to provide comfort for an 
 effective sleep.  Another step in planning will include the need for it to 
 complement furniture so as to combine with the ambience of a pleasant 
 restful bedroom.  This excellence of function and a pleasing aesthetic appeal 
 makes the bed beautiful in two aspects. 
(c)  The efficient cause is the carpenter who makes the bed; and 
(d)  The final cause is the finished product. 
For Aristotle these appear to be the necessary steps that must be completed in order 
to bring anything into existence.  In retracing the steps of the coming into being of 
the object we ought to be able to work out whether the designer‟s intention for the 
object was to contribute to human goods or not.  Sometimes the intention of the 
object is manifest from its obvious function, such our well-designed kitchen knife.   
Martin Heidegger analyses the Aristotelian model of causality as follows: “The four 
causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for 
something else.”311  He gives an example of a chalice which is “indebted” to the 
silver out of which it is made and says that the sacrificial vessel  “is at the same time 
indebted to the aspect of chaliceness.”312  Heidegger says that both the silver and the 
aspect in which the silver appears are in their respective ways co-responsible for the 
sacrificial vessel.
313
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The four causes must interact to bring forth the completed product.  However, it is 
only the efficient cause (the craftsman) who determines whether the article will be 
beautiful or not.  This is decided at the formal cause stage.  The craftsman will then  
“give it realisation in some material”314 so that the formal, efficient and final causes 
are the form of the finished product in different stages of actualisation.
315
  The 
interaction of all the causes commences when the craftsman begins to deliberate 
about the construction of the object.  There will be no point in his deciding to make a 
bed without settling on what he is going to make it out of, the need for it to produce a 
comfortable rest/sleep and the pleasing outward appearance of it as a complimenting 
piece of bedroom furniture.   The dispositions identified by Aristotle did not receive 
much attention in Western philosophy until the times of Aquinas.  He used them as 
his basis for natural law. Heidegger claims that our modern technological society is 
incapable of understanding Aristotle‟s interpretation of causation.  This is because 
people no longer have control over what they produce.
316
  Heidegger states that the 
Aristotelian theory of causation in our age  “might apply to the techniques of the 
hand craftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern machine powered technology.”  
This is because “technology, like Aristotle‟s theory of causation, is a mode of 
revealing, but the revealing never simply comes to an end.  It consists of manifold 
interlocking paths which we are unable to trace.”317   
In this chapter I have explained how Aristotle‟s precepts may be applied to modern 
life.  Apparently, Heidegger is correct when he says the revealing “never similarly 
comes to an end.”318  However, just because an ideal is not easily implemented, that 
does not mean it cannot be held.  The task the Greeks set us is still before us.  The 
beauty of a world that is always revealing itself sets us a perpetual challenge to try to 
understand it.  The enthusiasm that each generation brings to unravelling its hidden 
mysteries ensures the ideal of kalos kagathos will continue to beckon us to higher 






 Summing up the Kitchen Knife 
In conclusion, I shall attempt to draw together the various themes I have presented as 
illustrative of people aspiring to the ideal of kalos kagathos.  I have advanced the 
view that anti-modernist philosophy evaluates things and activities in their setting 
and according to their function.  Their beauty depends upon the degree to which they 
further human goods.  The beauty of some things is obvious, such as our well-made 
kitchen knife.  On the other hand, the speech in court needs to be heard right through 
before the intention behind it is revealed.  Likewise the example of the samurai 
sword shows that there are occasions when we need to acquire a knowledge of 
function before contribution to human goods can be assessed.   
However, our idea of an appropriate function may change over time.  The gallows 
example shows this.  It is an ugly spectacle because our social values no longer 
accept capital punishment.  The emphasis is now on rehabilitation after a fitting 
punishment.  The principal function of the justice system is towards community 
integration and the reform of the individual.  Perfecting the design of the kitchen 
knife is an ongoing process.  It will require the cooperation of all the people that will 
use it.   
The cooperative virtues had their beginnings in Homer.  In the Iliad, Homer 
challenged the received account of aristocratic behaviour.  Using negative emotions 
and behaviour such as adultery, sulkiness, anger and revenge, Homer penetrated the 
“external show” of Achilles‟ behaviour and brought forth a compassionate man.  
This psychical journey was taken in a world of cosmic orderliness, natural splendour, 
well-made utensils and handsome, well-dressed people.  The constancy of this 
scenery and the interference of the gods in human affairs was the idyllic setting in 
which Homer unfolded his rich and spirited morality tale.  Achilles‟ compassion 
reflected the functional excellence of the Homeric natural setting.  The kitchen was 
ideally designed; partly by nature and partly by people‟s perfectionism in making 
their appurtenances.  Homer supplied the blueprints for the ideal kitchen knife in the 
Iliad and the return of Odysseus to Ithaca. 
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Hesiod‟s Boeotia, with its “bleak and unfertile uplands” is in stark contrast to the 
blemishless Homeric world.  In Hesiod‟s agrarian world there were no agathoi.  Best 
of all was the panaristos, who was the Hesiodic parody of perfection.  More 
numerous were the esthloi.  Success depended upon hard work and following 
Hesiod‟s advice in his Works & Days.   This included instructions on farming in 
accordance with nature, methods for making tools, social behaviour; even hints on 
choosing a suitable wife.  Hesiod was concerned with justice in his rural world, 
which he conceived as an over-arching entity pervading the whole of human 
existence.  Justice, which inhered in nature‟s patterns, had to be striven for in human 
affairs.   
Hesiod‟s idea of justice comes through in his reprimand of his brother Perses, who 
had swindled him out of his inheritance by bribing the judges.  He talks of the ideal 
system of justice giving the same judgement to locals and strangers alike.  It is 
significant that Hesiod personalises justice in the daughter of Zeus.  Justice as a 
virtue is attainable by people, but only with perpetual effort.  Hesiod‟s ideal farmer 
functions appropriately at all times.  Hesiod‟s contribution to the marriage of the 
beautiful and the good was to improve the community by emphasising the value of 
co-operative behaviour, both with one‟s neighbours and with the cycles of nature, as 
ways of “how best to live in a difficult world.”  The components of the kitchen knife 
were all to hand, but the blade needed a little honing.   
Solon was the most powerful of the historical figures in my thesis.  He controlled the 
whole of Greece.  Solon introduced wide-ranging legislative reform aimed at 
neutralising the stranglehold the rich had on them and to create more opportunities 
for all.  The peasants were now free to sell their labour, without fear of being sold 
into slavery, and were encouraged to learn a trade to increase their economic 
viability.  For Solon, too, dike had a divine dimension.  He believed that every 
transgression of justice resulted in an imbalance to the cosmic harmony.  Solon‟s 
work did not focus just on personal development.  He remodelled the kitchen.  
Whether his people chose to resemble the well-made kitchen knife was a choice he 
left to them.     
Both Plato and Aristotle were concerned with the development of practical 
reasonableness.  Socrates‟s continual questions were directed at discovering a 
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common element in whatever expression was under discussion, such as “fineness” in 
the Hippias Major.  We see the same theme in Plato‟s Doctrine of the Forms and the 
metaphors I have discussed.  Continued examination of objects in this sensible world 
ought ultimately reveal their true nature.  The need for persistence is emphasised in 
the poor success rate in the Platonic dialogues.  For Plato, this effort represented 
people functioning at their highest level in which they would be in balance with their 
own nature and environment.  Success in the quest was not important.  This is a far 
cry from Homer‟s agathos.  The form of the kitchen knife was not going to reveal the 
excellence of its design easily.  Like the ideal of kalos kagathos it is inaccessible, but 
irresistible.   
Aristotle, too, was concerned with individual development.  However, he believed 
that the answer to man‟s fulfilment did not involve recourse to extramundane forms.  
Although he devoted the majority of his Nichomachean Ethics to personal 
development, he is quite clear in Book 1 that he thinks the pursuit of politics is the 
highest form of human activity.  This is because it involves the orderly functioning of 
the community.  Aristotle taught that if people do not get the beginnings of ethical 
behaviour in the family, they should find them in the community. Thus, it is the 
community that educates and to the community that one must continually contribute.  
The ideal of kalos kagathos can only be present in the complete individual who is 
master of all the virtues and also a respected community member.   
I would like to finish with a few comments on the work of John Cottingham.  He 
holds that, “The Socratic model of striving for philosophical wisdom by careful 
logical analysis is now seen as narrow, cramped and confined … we have to burst the 
restricting bonds of analytic rationality.”  In Chapter 4 of his Philosophy and the 
Good Life, Cottingham challenges the sufficiency of Plato‟s teaching on akrasia 
(lack of self-control) by introducing psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic 
considerations.  His point is that the more technical knowledge we amass about 
ourselves the more uncertain we become as to the extent of our personal freedom.  
However, this ought not to deter us from a continual striving to becoming more 
caring members of our communities and developing an increased respect for our own 
self worth.  The other authors I have been discussing think that reason in the 
cooperative virtues provides a formula for human happiness.  However, Cottingham 
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observes that since the development of sciences such as psychotherapy our way 
forward is more complex.  Our job to go on searching for an ethics that will result in 
excellent, functioning behaviour in all circumstances.  It is in that pursuit that we will 
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